



OTHER WORKS

by

JAMES MARK BALDWIN

HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol I. SENSES AND INTELLECT; Vol. II. FEELING AND WILL. Holt & Co., New York. 2d ed. 1891-2.

ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY. Same Publishers. London, Macmillan. 1893. Translated into Spanish.

MENTAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CHILD AND THE RACE. 3d ed. 1906. New York and London, Macmillan. Translated into French and German.

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THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

OR

PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY

THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

OR

Psychology and Sociology

BY

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PREFACE

THIS little book has been written under the very exact and exacting limitations of space imposed by the editor of the series.* In the space allowed it is impossible to argue or to demonstrate. Accordingly, I have chosen to illustrate a point of view rather than to establish it. No doubt, to those not already committed to a different view, this may itself be about as good a way to make the point as any other — to show that the main facts to be interpreted serve to illustrate it.

I regret, however, that the limitation in size has made it necessary to omit

*The French Bibliothèque Internationale de Sociologie, Series in 18, edited by R. Worms (Paris, Giard et Brière, for which this book was written by request. The French edition bears the title, "Psychologie et Sociologie (l'Individu et la Société)." Besides verbal alterations throughout, I have added one chapter (vi) to the book in the English form.

references to authorities. In my own larger and more reasoned books, of which this is in a sense a sort of popular resumé, full citations are made of other and of different theories. With this excuse for the omission, I apologize to those able writers whose works should be mentioned in any treatment of the topics here presented.

The point of view from which I write is, briefly stated, this: Society is looked upon as a mode of organization *sui generis*; its matter is psychological; its rules of organization are those which characterize the personal development of minds in relation to one another. To this no analogy, drawn from another sphere of fact, biological, chemical, physical, can do any sort of justice: it can be understood only by the knowledge, direct and indirect, of the motives and movements of minds capable of certain modes of intercourse. Sociology itself, dealing with the external and historical aspects of

social life, must allow and demand the psychological interpretation of its results. Anything short of this deprives social theory of its most fruitful points of view, and, so far as it has practical applications, distorts the social fact and mutilates the social body.

In this matter, a fundamental distinction — overlooked notably by those who explain society in biological terms — should be always held in mind: the distinction, namely, between the evolution of the social group *as a whole*, under conditions of natural selection and competition with other groups, and the *inner development of the social life within the group*. It is the latter only that is truly social; the former takes account of the conditions, external and auxiliary, but not intrinsic, under which the inner organization takes place and progresses. The evolution of racial, communal, and civil types is most interesting and important; but the statement of the geo-

graphical, biological, and other conditions under which such differences arise gives no account whatever of the essential social bond, inner and intrinsic, that *characterizes each and all of the types alike*. This is mental and moral, not physical nor vital. J. M. B.

December, 1910

The material of the book has also served as basis for a course of twenty-five lectures on "Psycho-Sociology," delivered in the National University of Mexico, October to December, 1910. I wish to acknowledge to the Mexican authorities my appreciation of the honor done me by the invitation to inaugurate the systematic work of the new university.

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THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

OR

PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY

THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

CHAPTER I

The Individual and the Group

I

IT is clear, even from the most superficial examination of the facts and movements of social life, that two different points of view and two somewhat different interests are present in it. The rights, duties, liberties of the individual may have emphasis, on the one hand, and the requirements, laws, conventions of society as an organized body may be invoked, on the other hand. These two contrasted, if not actually opposed, interests confront the social theorist no less than the man of affairs, and the contrast inevitably suggests itself as point of departure for discussion.

In fact, the contrast takes form in the distinction between the problems of the psychologist and sociologist respectively. However we may refine the distinction and confuse the issue by debating the exact dividing line, it still remains true that psychology deals with the individual, and sociology deals with the group.

This does not mean, of course, that their respective domains are separate; not at all. The individual mind, as dealt with by the psychologist, is not a cell closed to influences from the group; far from it. The psychologist reports the individual as in substance a microcosm reflecting the group life in miniature. And it is equally true that the group as dealt with by the sociologist has no existence except by the compliance and co-operation of the individuals. So we should expect the two sciences to draw constantly upon each other. The psychologist finds certain movements taking place in the individual mind which indicate social

conditions of life and habit, and social requirements of adaptation and concession; he must then appeal to the sociologist to inform him of the modes of organization existing in the group to which the individual response is made. On the other hand, the sociologist is at every turn dependent upon the psychologist to inform him of the movements of the individual mind which incorporate themselves in social institutions.

20 It is not my intention to discuss the more refined aspects of the relation of the two sciences; such discussions are already interminable and for the most part fruitless. I wish, on the contrary, simply to designate the two points of view as characterizing the two branches of knowledge respectively; and on this general basis to show the present state of knowledge in regard to the great topics common to both. We will see that, apart from refinements, the distinction can be very

well maintained; but that most of the interests represented in individual and social life are common and liable to both interpretations alternatively. It is, to my mind, the most remarkable outcome of modern social theory — the recognition of the fact that the individual's normal growth lands him in essential solidarity with his fellows, while on the other hand the exercise of his social duties and privileges advances his highest and purest individuality. The movements are one, although the sciences, from their necessary difference in point of view, must treat them as if they were two.

We will notice the main topics of current theory, therefore, in the following pages, under the two rubrics, "psychological" and "sociological"; at the same time that the results will show their essential concurrence in result for what may be called the philosophy of society, and also for the theory of history, since history is simply the record of the events

of human life, as shown by the operation of the individual and social forces acting together.

I will first sketch the origin and extent of the contrast between the individual and society, and then show, in a series of short chapters, how the motives of the individual mind, appearing in its competitions, limitations, solidarities, training, loyalties, inventiveness, etc., and working together, issue in a type of collective or social organization, by which their force is conserved and made always available for humanity. Personal individualism shows itself in social competition; personal sympathy and morality in social solidarity; personal imitiveness and training in pedagogical institutions; personal loyalty in civic institutions; personal inventiveness in social progress. The motive in each case preserves its essential character, although tempered and transformed in the social movement as a whole.

Let us, then, at the outset, set forth

the leading principles involved in the actual relation of individual and group.

II

The individual comes into the world with the impulse of the history of the race behind him. He has few perfect instincts, such as many of the animals show. He is, on the contrary, plastic and educable. But his development is nevertheless to be a compromise between the two tendencies which throughout all his life represent individualism and collectivism. He has distinctly egoistic and individualistic impulses, but with them he has also positive predispositions to social life. These two germinal tendencies are to receive their more perfect adjustment, or at least a working relation, in his education and training in the habits and usages of the social group.

It is not necessary to dwell upon the more individualistic factor in his heredity;

it is summed up in the word "appetite." He has a mass of tendencies which are necessary to the preservation and advancement of his vegetative and animal life. These are of necessity direct, strong, and self-seeking.

But over against these we find certain positive impulses which are of a quasi-social or gregarious sort, ready soon after birth to develop the other side of his nature. Bashfulness, shame, jealousy, are some of the more fundamental tendencies rooted in the organic structure of the human babe,* which seem to reveal ancestral conditions of collective life and habit.

*As to the origin of these tendencies, I accept the selectionist, or Darwinian, rather than the Lamarckian point of view. A modification of Darwinism, known as "Organic Selection," is presented in my book, "Darwin and the Humanities" (Baltimore and London, 1909), and in the earlier work, "Development and Evolution." Cf. also Delage and Goldsmith, "Théories de l'Évolution" (Paris, 1909), Chap. xvii. This theory holds that individual or collective habits of life, while not physically inherited, nevertheless serve to screen and preserve congenital variations that are coincident in direction with themselves, and thus the process of selection gives the same result that direct inheritance of acquired characters would be expected to give.

With these go, in a more positive sense, certain great motives of action which, natural as they are and quasi-instinctive, become the tools of "socialization according to nature" very early in the individual's personal history. *Play* and *imitation*, twin brothers in the scheme of the child's hereditary impulses, come to assume, each alone and both together, a very extraordinary role.

By play the young animal and the child alike come into the most fruitful social relations with one another. The meaning of the varied situations of life is learned in play, under conditions free from the storm and stress of actual serious life; and thus the functions playfully exercised are developed. The great activities of later utility in the struggles of life, and in the varied social conditions of existence, are thus made ready. In play we find one of the great meeting places of the forces of individualism and collectivism.

Imitation is another great socializing

function. The child naturally falls to imitating, and when once this has begun he is a veritable copying machine, turning out acts, opinions, decisions, which are based with more or less correctness upon models found in his social environment.

By imitation he gets the "feel" of things that others do, and so learns to value the safe and sane; by imitation, he tries on the varied ways of doing things, and so learns his own capacities and limitations; by imitation he actually acquires the stored up riches of the social movements of history; by imitation he learns to use the tools of culture, speech, writing, manual skill, so that through the independent use of these tools he may become a more competent and fruitful individual; finally, it is by imitation in the way of varied and effortful trial that he succeeds in being original and inventive. Of this last result, more later on; here let us note simply that

imitation in its social role is not *mere* imitation, *mere copying*, slavish adherence to the prevalent and easy ways of doing things; that would be a superficial way of looking at this most extraordinary set of functions. Imitation to the intelligent and earnest imitator is never slavish, never mere repetition; it is, on the contrary, *a means to further ends*, a method of absorbing what is present in others and of making it over in forms peculiar to one's own temper and valuable to one's own genius.

Armed with these impulses, the weapons of competition as well as of co-operation, the young hero of the nursery begins his personal development, as a centre of considerate and purposeful action. The nucleus of personality, to the outsider, is the bodily self; it is a sort of social unit; but to the individual himself, the distinction between persons as minds and persons as mere bodily presences soon springs up and takes on greater and

greater significance. For this is not an inborn distinction. The sense of self is not a ready-made and perfect gift; it is a slow growth, the stages of which show in a most interesting way the interaction of the individualistic and social factors.

It begins, probably, when the child notes the capricious and seemingly lawless actions of persons, in contrast with the more regular and mechanical actions of things, such as the swinging of the pendulum, the opening and closing of the door, the rolling of the ball upon the floor. Persons do the most unexpected, the most inconsistent things. And it is these things that attract attention and call out the impulse to imitate. The child imitates the acts of persons.

Thus he is admitted to the inside of the other's mind, as it were, and discovers that bodies are not, as minds are, centres of feeling, will, and knowledge. He makes very quickly the discovery

that his own personality is likewise two-sided; that he, too, is a mind on the inside, and that that which others see of him on the outside is not the mind, but merely the physical person. He goes through a series of distinguishable processes of interpretation, all worked out in detail by the psychologist,* which are of momentous significance for the evolution of personality.

Put very briefly and untechnically, these processes are in outline as follows:

The mind of others is at first to the child the source of capricious and mysterious actions and events. It is located simply in the physical person of others: it is then "projective"—simply "projected" into the other person, nurse, mother, or whoever it be.

But this sort of presence is then taken *over into himself*, by imitation, and illus-

*See the writer's "Social and Ethical Interpretations," 4th ed., 1906, for a detailed account of these processes of personal growth. Cf. also McDougall, "Introduction to Social Psychology" (London, 1909).

trated in those more intimate experiences which are peculiar to his own mental life — pains, efforts, emotional crises, etc. These become the means by which he interprets the “projective” characteristics of others. Their inner life is understood in terms of his own. The whole set of events, having personal, and not merely physical or bodily significance, becomes “subjective”; it is peculiar to the “subject,” which is now for the first time differentiated with some clearness from things.

This is followed again by a return movement. The subjective experiences — say a series of violent efforts, or a violent pain — are in analogous circumstances read into others also. When the emotional expression warrants it, or when cries or gestures indicate it, the subjective is made over to other persons; it is “ejected” into the individuals of the immediate *entourage*.

O ther persons are thought of then in

just the same terms as the private self; and the private self in the same terms as other persons; it is impossible to distinguish them, so far as the meaning in subjective terms is concerned. The thought of self is of a *larger self which includes personalities* in general; and the different persons, in all that which is not singular or characteristic of each, *are fundamentally the same.*

III

The significance of this for social theory is evident. It is impossible for any one to begin life as an individualist in the sense of radically separating himself from his social fellows. The social bond is established and rooted in the very growth of self-consciousness. Each individual's apprehension of his own personal self and its interests involves the recognition of others and their interests; and his pursuit of one type of purposes,

generous or selfish, is in so far the pursuit of the other also.

This accounts for the very radical and fundamental character of some of the social emotions: sympathy, remorse, jealousy, mortification, etc., in presence of others or in view of their opinions. The individual finds the bond which binds him to his fellows too strong for light or "cavalierly" treatment. The movement by which he seeks to retire into the citadel of his private interest, and to ignore the personal rights, views, and judgments of others, involves the dwelling upon his own self and its interests; but this stirs up the equivalences and identities by which his self-consciousness involves the thought of others. He thus only sharpens, instead of dulling, his susceptibility to their presence and attitude.

The significance of this, however, for psychology resides in the fact that it shows the true basis of social relationships;

they are rooted in the normal psychic processes of individual growth. We may then consider as answered the question as to how the individual is able to be social. He does not have to consider the question at all, nor do we, for he is simply social by the same right that he is personal. He grows in personality and individuality by growing also in sociality. He does not have two lives, two sets of interests, two selves; one personal and the other social. He has but one self, which is personal and social in one, by right of the essential and normal movement of his growth.

This has consequences of the first importance throughout our study. It becomes the presupposition of our answers to questions of the relation of the one individual to others, considered from the psychic point of view; that is, from the point of view of the persons themselves. The social relation is in all cases *intrinsic to the life, interests, and purposes of the*

individual; he feels and apprehends the vitality of social relations in all the situations of his life.

On the side of sociology, too, this truth is of no less importance. Every social situation is constituted by the thinking and acting of certain individuals, in varying degrees and sorts of co-operation or opposition constituting the social relationship. The mere outside view, the telling-off of the physical acts, the number of cases, the circumstantial conditions of social action — all this is artificial, unless we realize that the situation is social not in virtue of these external relations, but solely in virtue of the understanding of the place and function — the desire, the opinion, the purpose — of all the actors by each. The essential thing to make a situation social is a normal self, a thought or feeling of personality, in the actors, by which they are able to combine, discuss, compete, with certain recognized “rules of the game.” A sit-

uation which is psychic in character and scope is essential. Without it no society could arise.

This is seen negatively in aggregations of persons in conditions in which normal conscious relations are not established: among the insane, among merely gregarious animals ruled by instinct, among persons who understand not a word of one another's language, or among those who have no interests in common. Society simply does not exist and cannot be constituted in such conditions. The essential bond is lacking, *the mental bond*, the common thought, and the common apprehension of personality.

It is clear, therefore, that we may in anticipation expect certain sorts of sociological theory and doctrine to fail: theories which do not recognize, or which actually deny the dependence of all social life upon mental factors. Such theories, for example, as those which make geographical distinctions es-

sential; or those which make force or constraint fundamental; or those which interpret social processes and changes in terms of biological or physiological functions or organizations. All these have their force, since all these sorts of influence do in more or less subordinate ways influence the form, the direction of movement, and the differentiation of types in the social body. But as soon as any one of these theories substitutes its favorite fact or its selected set of forces — chemical, mechanical, physical, biological — for the psychic relations by which people having minds come into co-operation in a social situation, and by which the development of such situations is secured, so soon the theory in question commits suicide. It is no longer a theory of society, but a theory of one or more of those sets of forces by which the social movement is externally conditioned or affected.*

*I have elsewhere suggested the use of the term "Socionomic" in application to those conditions and forces which condition and limit are truly "social" while not

This general position will be illustrated fully as we proceed. Its bearings are stated in some detail in the discussion of our first topic, "Social Solidarity." In that connection the biological theory of society will naturally come up for criticism.

being themselves intrinsic or essential to it: "Social and Ethical Interpretations," 1st ed., Introduction, also 4th ed., Introduction 2, and Section 313a, Chapter xi.

CHAPTER II

*Social Solidarity and Community**

WE find a certain difficulty in discussing such a topic as solidarity, arising from the generality of the term.

Considered as a sociological concept, solidarity is an affair of the mutual relations of a more permanent sort, subsisting in a group of individuals; as a psychological concept, it connotes the significance of these relations as understood by the individuals themselves, or at least as reflected into their minds more or less consciously. Both of these aspects of solidarity will concern us; and this con-

*Parts of this chapter (i-iii) repeat the article on "The Basis of Social Solidarity," a paper read at the Berne Meeting, 1909, of the Institut International de Sociologie, and published in the *Annals de l'Institut International de Sociologie*, 1910, Vol. XII, and in English in the "American Journal of Sociology," 1910, pp. 817ff.

sideration leads us to recognize a certain distinction covered by the terms "solidarity" and "community." The term solidarity has sprung up in studies of the more objective or sociological sort, and it is generally confined to such discussions; it has little currency in psychology. On the other hand, the term "community" is used in psychology and logic for the commonness or coincidence, for different individuals, of what is in the mind of more than one of them. We speak of community of interests, community or common force of knowledge* or opinion, the community or coincidence of feeling in a group. I shall adopt this usage, confining the term solidarity more strictly to the objective or external manifestations of the relations subsisting in a group or society, and employing the term community for the sense of

*The common force or "community" of knowledge is treated in detail in the work "Thought and Things," Vol. I, Chap. vii, and Vol. II, Chaps. ii and ix

this mutuality and commonness of knowledge and action, in the minds of the individuals concerned.

With so much explanation of the terms to be employed, we may at once pass on to the consideration of solidarity and the community which is in each instance correlative to it.

I

A great body of studies in psychology and sociology has shown that there is a progressive development in actual social association and organization, as advance is made in the scale of animal life. This development has proceeded *parri passu* with the evolution of mind. We find, indeed, three sorts of groups, related generically to one another, but so distinct from one another that we have to consider them as relatively distinguishable in their type. I shall name them, first, for convenience of designation, and

then proceed to characterize them with reference to the natural bonds of solidarity which they respectively show.

These modes of "social" or collective life are: (1) the instinctive or gregarious; (2) the spontaneous or plastic; and (3) the reflective or social proper.

1. **THE INSTINCTIVE OR GREGARIOUS GROUP.** The characters of this sort of group life are quite clearly expressed by the terms "instinctive" and "gregarious." The former term suggests its biological character, the latter its social character. In saying there is a form of association that is instinctive, we mean to suggest what is characteristic of instinct as such; this may be explained under certain headings as follows.

(a.) In the first place the endowment involved in this sort of association is, like instinct, *physically inherited by individual animals*. The tendency to live together and to pursue certain habits of life in common is in fact native. The social

instincts are so correlated, as between individuals, that one without the other, or others, is incomplete and ineffective. The family instincts of animals are examples of this; and the maternal, sexual, racial instinctive tendencies in man.

An important corollary is seen in the fact that such habits of life *do not have to be acquired*. For such activities no training is necessary, no learning from experience. This means that, in such apparently co-operative actions, psychological factors are not primarily or largely involved.

(b.) Again we find that, being thus stereotyped by heredity, such modes of action *are fixed and unprogressive*; they admit of very little modification and development. When the requisite environmental conditions are present, their working is effective and sufficient; but when the conditions change, and any considerable accommodation or readjustment is called for, the animals so en-

dowed are more or less helpless. They are not able to substitute intelligent action for instinctive reaction.

(c.) Such modes of action, being in the main physically inherited, are in their origin *the product of biological laws*. They have been reduced in the process of evolution to the condition of nervous functions; they have become part of the creature's physiological endowment. They illustrate racial habit and selection.*

We may say, then, that such instinctive actions, however psychological their results may appear to be, *are in their modus operandi biological reactions*. They can be explained only on the biological principles of selection and inheritance.

*That is, they have arisen as other instincts have, by natural selection working upon advantageous variations. For theories of the origin of instinct the reader may consult my work, "Development and Evolution," and also the little book already referred to, called "Darwin and the Humanities."

Important works on the subject which have some reference to the social instincts are Lloyd Morgan's "Habit and Instinct," and K. Groos' "The Play of Animals" and "The Play of Man."

They are more or less automatic in their performance, and they are subject to the laws of physical heredity. And it is evident that such modes of action, while gregarious in external appearance and result, as involving two or more individuals in a joint action, are not in any true sense social. They appear to show external solidarity, but this does not require any degree of psychic community.

I may cite an instance that falls under my notice as I write. A family of swans on Lake Geneva swim across the lake always in a certain order: one of the parents goes first, the little ones follow next, and the other old one brings up the rear. This is evidently instinctive. The order in which they go is useful for the protection of the young, which are defended by the parents both before and behind. The whole family is involved; the action is not learned from experience; it is probably not capable of much change

or improvement. So considered,* it is an affair of selected adaptation. The requisite connections are established in the nervous structure of the creatures and the function lacks special psychological features. Nature shows a wide range of instances similar to this.

If we apply the term solidarity to this mode of association we should characterize it as "biological," in distinction from other forms. It is *innate, unintelligent, unprogressive*, but *deep-seated and very uniform* in its action.

2. THE SPONTANEOUS OR PLASTIC GROUP. Comparative psychologists find among the animals another form of association also; a group which does not present the features just pointed out as characteristic of that which is purely or largely biological. Animal life is full of collective actions which are due to experience, habits of common or joint

*That is, considered as instinctive. I may be mistaken in so considering this particular case.

behavior *which are not inherited, but learned.* It is in connection with the theory of such actions that the extreme value, in the economy of the animal's conduct, of the impulses of play, imitation, rivalry, etc., is to be recognized. By the exercise of such gregarious or quasi-social impulses as these, the young are trained in the habits of life of their kind.

But the operation of learning or "profiting by experience" by means of such impulses, involves psychic processes; it proceeds by "trial and error," persistent imitation, gradual selection of happy hits in the direction of better accommodation and adjustment. In this they stand out in striking contrast to the instinctive acts already described. Their points of distinction are in the main the following.

(a.) These acquired modes of collective action illustrate *social transmission rather than physical heredity.* The great body of the animals' collective activities

are re-established in each generation, being transmitted from old to young by processes of imitative absorption. There is, indeed, in the actions handed down in this way, a real continuity from generation to generation, a "social heredity," as it has been called, as effective and compelling as physical heredity. But it is maintained by actual learning, on the part of countless individuals, who are in this sense, and must be, sufficiently "plastic" to absorb the lessons of the family and group tradition. Each must be plastic in the presence of the group life and its agencies.

Now it is evident that such learning, with the resulting forming or molding effect upon individuals, presents a sharp contrast to the sort of activity described above as instinctive and biological. In order to be plastic, the individual must be relatively free from the compulsion of inherited instinct. The modification of function and structure involved in effec-

tive learning requires the relative decay of fixed reactions; greater relative plasticity of nerve and muscle takes its place.

(b.) So far as the individual is concerned, this sort of plastic activity, with the resulting association of individuals together, allows the essential growth or progress of the individual, and in fact issues in it. The individual grows into the tradition of the group, just as in other cases by instinctive acts the individual shows himself already possessed of the hereditary traits of the race. But from the point of view of the group, this plastic learning is an agency of conformity, conservation, stability, and solidarity. The individual does not go by this method beyond what the group life has already acquired; his learning is limited to tradition. All the individuals of the group *learn the same things*; and what they learn is the body of useful actions already established in the collective life of the group.

(c.) The laws of this mode of collective action are, accordingly, *psychological, not merely biological*. There is a give and take directly from mind to mind: the copying of a model, the contagion of feeling, the joint satisfaction arising from united activity. Other individuals enter directly into the psychological and social situation, in the mind of each; and these others furnish the essential stimulation. Each responds to each through their mental part.

We have here, then, a mode of *psychological solidarity*, different in its origin and nature from the biological solidarity of instinct. Its processes are psychological: processes of imitation, suggestion, contagion, spontaneous union in common experience and action. It is only by the recognition of these psychological processes that this mode of solidarity can be properly understood. There is here a mode of actual community of feeling and end accompanying the external solidarity.

3. THE REFLECTIVE OR SOCIAL GROUP PROPER. When we come to consider the higher forms of social life, armed with this account of the instinctive and spontaneous forms, we become aware that still other genetic motives and factors come into play. It has been conclusively shown by various writers that there is a difference between cases, on the one hand, in which the individual is simply carried away by a social current — in which, that is, he is plastic in the hands of the group, as just described — and cases, on the other hand, in which he intentionally and voluntarily co-operates with others in the pursuit of intelligent ends.* In the former there is an emotional response to a social suggestion; in the latter an intelligent judgment made with a view to consequences to be

*This distinction is recognized by many writers; I may cite the following philosophical and psychological works as representative: Mackenzie, "Social Philosophy"; Alexander, "Moral Order and Progress"; Baldwin, "Social and Ethical Interpretations."

attained. The latter mode of co-operation constitutes a group that may properly be called "social."

In it we detect, in turn, certain characters which are absent from both the forms of solidarity already described.

(a.) These intelligent acts of co-operation cannot be considered as due to either physical or social heredity: they are not embodied in native physical endowment, nor included in social tradition. *They are social novelties*, new modes of thought and action, involving a greater or lesser degree of individual deliberation and choice. As such they come into conflict in many instances with activities of the hereditary and plastic types. All social reform, for example, is accomplished by individuals who think and act outside the established conventions and traditions; it represents a protest on the part of individuals, from the point of view of personal intelligence and moral sentiment, against the conventions which

have been established by earlier social intercourse, and which are socially transmitted. The reformer must convince others in order to convert them; he must criticize the old as irrational in order to establish the more rational, the new. All this depends upon the successful appeal to the intelligence and sentiment — moral, æsthetic, etc. — of individuals, which leads them to rebel against the authority of society and the rule of plastic suggestion. The action of the crowd is often disorganizing and at best unproductive; the action of the reflective group, such as the committee, the legislature, the administrative bureau, is progressive and organizing.

(b.) From the point of view of the group, therefore, solidarity of intelligence, of conviction, of higher sentiment, now takes the place of the solidarity of mere instinct or blind feeling. This is the form of organization that is truly to be called “social.” It characterizes the hu-

man society in opposition to the animal company and the human crowd, for only in such a group, a society, is there an internal organization as such. The gregarious instincts do not issue in social organization; each individual, on the contrary, acts as his nervous structure directly compels him to act. Further, there is no social organization in the plastic crowd, hypnotized by a demagogue or carried away by the suggestion of a social fellow. The group can be organized only through processes of a psychological sort, through which the individual becomes aware of his place and function in a greater or lesser social whole, and wills to maintain it by the exercise of his judgment.

(c.) I have elsewhere shown in detail* that the growth of the individual's sense of personality or of the personal "self" proceeds by the organization of the

*"Social and Ethical Interpretations." See also the brief account given above, pp. 24ff.

psychological materials of social life. As individuals grow more competent personally, they also become more intimately organized socially. The growth of the individual "ego" involves the recognition of the social "alter," and establishes a conscious relation between them. The resulting solidarity is that of *conscious intention and voluntary co-operation*.

This view is now very widely accepted.* It unifies the individual and society, and establishes solidarity on the higher plane of common intelligence and joint volition.

(d.) We may say, therefore, of this social and reflective mode of collective life, that it is not biologically determined, nor is it determined by the general psychological movement of feeling and impulse; but that it is determined by the specific psychological processes of intelligence. It requires the conscious and

*See, for example, the very learned and authoritative work in Spanish by Posada, "Introduction to Sociology," Vol. I, of "Principles of Sociology."

voluntary co-operation of individuals in a social situation.


II

Coming now to consider these three modes of collective life comparatively, we find it possible to read them from the point of view of genetic continuity or progression: the instinctive passes into the plastic and this in turn yields in the course of evolution to the reflective or social proper. In so far as these forms of life and conduct require chemical and physical processes, these latter should be recognized as conditions essential to the movement; but such conditions do not of themselves yield any mode of group solidarity, nor do they of themselves explain any mode that actually exists.*

*If one cares to call chemical synthesis, for example, a case of solidarity, he does so only by eviscerating the term of all its social connotation. In that sense the planetary system is a "group," for it has the solidarity of gravitation! But what light do such statements shed on social life?

This genetic movement may be illustrated by the following diagram, in which the order and stages of actual group life are exhibited to the eye.

The expanding cone shows the widening of the factors concerned in the whole movement or progression: the instinctive or biological mode *In*, passes into the plastic or psychological, *Pl*, and this in



In-Instinctive. *Pl*-Plastic. *So*-social. The spaces *a*, *a'*, etc., show the increased area of facts and principles peculiar to each mode beyond those of the preceding.

turn is succeeded by the reflective or social proper, *So*.

In human society all these motives to solidarity exist together. We never leave our bodies behind, with their instinctive tendencies, nor do we ever free ourselves from the compulsion of direct emotion and impulse, which tend to make us on occasion the plastic instruments of social suggestion. But still that which differentiates human society is the presence of reflective sociality.

III

In view of these truths, fully established, as I believe, in biology and psychology, certain more general points of interpretation may be suggested.

1. It will at once be seen that no strictly biological interpretation can exhaust all the modes of collective life, with their accompanying forms of solidarity. The biological form is one of physical

heredity; it shows the regularity and compulsion of instinct. How can we account, on such principles, for the social transmission and the personal caprice of the plastic activities of a group? And how far remote from such explanation do the forms appear which show intelligent co-operation and refined sentiment! If one use the biological figure at all, one should restrict its application to those facts of the social life in which instinct operates with least complication from psychological functions, and in which there is present no interference due to intelligent restraint and choice. Such, for example, are the quasi-social exhibitions of the sexual instinct, and the rivalries of family and clan in which the family and racial impulses of kinship are uncontrolled.

But even in these cases of the play of brute biological forces, the influence of convention and social habit, as well as that of intelligent self-control, is seldom

quite lacking. When such modifying influences, psychological and moral, entirely fail, we consider the individual a victim of his heredity; and instead of taking the purity of his biological equipment as the criterion of social sanity, our practical judgment is the reverse. *In practice* we scout the biological interpretation by taking its best exponent for a dangerous person; we isolate him in an institution where the anti-social are confined to keep them from doing injury to society.

2. The same remark may be made, in effect, of the attempt to interpret the social group entirely in terms of social tradition, taken with its correlative mode of spontaneous and plastic co-operation. The crowd, following a leader — whether this leader be society itself or a temporary chieftain — is the typical situation to such theorists; to them it illustrates the social group at its purest. Imitation and compulsory suggestion, or

compulsion *per se*, are its keynotes. These words give the answer to the question of M. Tarde, *qu'est qu'une societe ?*

Of course we must admit that there is in actual life much solidarity of this type — imitative, suggestive, in actual result compulsory. As soon as the bonds of instinct were loosed in racial evolution, co-operation became more varied in its modes, and new forms of group life arose. Suggestion took the place of instinct, and social succeeded to physical heredity.

But here again we must accept the limitations which the due recognition of the facts imposes. The reign of suggestion and contagion, and with it the rule of tradition, with its compulsion, do not result in those forms of organization which show progress. Individual advancement in the more complicated relations of life, and the formation of institutions of social utility, both require

inventive thought on the part of single men and the adoption of this thought on the part of society. It is from the individual that the inventive ideas come; and these ideas cause discussion and opposition as well as imitative absorption and plastic propagation. It is only after society has generalized the individual's thoughts in a form acceptable to the social body, that these can be embodied in institutions of public value. Only thus is matter added to the social store.*

This process requires, it is evident, competent individual reflection and discriminating judgment; it cannot be reduced to mere emotional reaction, nor to the constraint of enforced tradition.

3. The treatment of this highest mode of solidarity falls, accordingly, to both sociology and social psychology. To social psychology it presents the experience of individual reflection and self-consciousness, implicating a set of social

*See Chap. v, below.

fellows or socii in a social situation — in relationships of actual life. From this flow the common processes which result in the establishment of institutions having the support of the fellow-members of the group. For sociology this gives an objective social situation: the related group becomes matter of scientific investigation. For both these sciences *the subject-matter is sui generis*; for psychology, it is *an experience sui generis*; for sociology, it is *a mode of organization sui generis*. Sociology can properly deal with it only by detailed and exhaustive investigation of the forms it actually shows.

4. In all the discussions of solidarity, therefore, the first requirement is that of determining, in the particular case, which of *these typical modes of collective life we have before us*. Religion, for example, goes through all three of these genetic stages; so also does government; so also does morality. It is vain to discuss any one of these great topics of human inter-

est from the point of view of the analysis of one stage only. Our investigation must be longitudinal, genetic. Only thus can we arrive at a real understanding of the successive manifestations of the motive under investigation, and see the racial importance of the institutions in which it has from time to time embodied itself.

IV

A good illustration of these three forms of solidarity is to be found in the results of recent studies in criminology — a sphere in which anti-sociality, or the lack of solidarity, is the topic under investigation. It has been made out that there are three great classes of criminals: the “criminal born,” the “occasional criminal,” and the professional or “deliberate criminal.” The first of these is a criminal by heredity; his acts are instinctive, compelling, and irresponsible so far as they are strictly of this type. He should be

looked upon as one having a chronic and incurable disease.

The second class, that of the "occasional criminal," contains individuals who are creatures of suggestion, imitation, and passion. It is the occasion, the opportunity, the combination of circumstances that excites the passion of such a man and leads him into crime. He should have the advantage of sound training and of constant social support in a well-chosen environment. His treatment should be quite different from that accorded to the born criminal.

In the third class we find the "professional criminal," the deliberate plotter against the social order. Properly speaking, this is the real criminal, the social criminal. His crime is reflective and voluntary; he adopts means to accomplish his destructive ends. He knows himself to be criminal, and can place the true value upon his acts in the entire social situation in which his crimes are

committed. He is the true enemy of society. He should be pursued by all the agencies of suppression that society has at its command — suppression at least from the theater in which he can pursue his crimes.

These types of criminality are what they are from the lack in each respectively of the appropriate form of solidarity, which becomes all the more conspicuous by its absence.

How inadequate the sociology that does not resort to the psychological differences to distinguish these types in individual cases, and how mistaken the practical penology that proceeds without observing them! There is no general or purely sociological definition of crime that will serve as basis for practical punishment or for social reform. The results of different cases may be the same: the motives which serve as cause may be radically different. In any given case, the criminal act may be a mere biological

reaction, an outburst of passion, or a deliberate decision of will.

In the next paragraph we will trace these psychological differences further, on the side of the community of thought and feeling that accompanies social solidarity.

V

From the foregoing considerations it is plain that the course of development in social or collective life has proceeded from the solidarity of biological organization and instinct to the community of mental and intelligent, or strictly social, modes of thought and action. The fixed and unchanging sorts of association seen in the animal's hereditary tendencies yield to the spontaneous and changing collective life of suggestion and imitation, seen in the plastic and emotional crowd. But it is not till this in turn is succeeded by the development in individuals of the

mental functions which embody and advance self-consciousness, with a certain measure of reflection, deliberation, and conscious choice, that those more permanent modes of grouping are secured which can be called societies. This is characteristic of human life alone. The animal companies, even the highest, are a combination of instinct and mere suggestion; they do not have forms of organization suited to the conditions of life, devised and carried forward by the members of the group. On the contrary, they show certain typical forms which, when the circumstances change, go to the wall.

The truly social, however, is seen in the movement of intelligent co-operation, in which planning, deliberation, discussion, united action for defense and offense, mutual aid, and so forth, are more or less in evidence. It goes forward under its own modes of organization, alike in the individual's knowledge and feeling, and in the actual associations or insti-

tutions which it produces in the group as such.

Leaving over for the present the consideration of the latter — the institutions with which sociology is concerned — let us consider a little the higher forms of community arising in the thought and feeling of the individual. These take on certain great forms in which the movements of knowledge, feeling, and action have special names in our daily life. The community of action is what we find in the individuals' "morality," that of knowledge in "public opinion" and reasonable belief founded on common judgment and science, and that of sentiment in "religion" and "art." All these are forms which organized social life takes on in the thought and mind of the individuals of the social group.

In the development of these great forces of individual and social life, common knowledge, common morality, common religion and art, there are the same

psychological processes at work. The two movements in the individual's mind are those known popularly as judgment and imagination. By judgment the details of new knowledge, however acquired, are generalized and formulated in concepts or laws which are available for all and to which the belief and opinion of all are held. The truths of science, morals, religion — all truth, in fact — is rendered in statements or judgments of general character, and recorded for the information and discipline of the generations as they pass. The information accruing to science is a mass of stored up data, accepted by all the individuals, whether in individual or public capacity. Judgment is a conserving and generalizing process.

But over against the use of judgment to recognize and formulate truth, the individual uses his imagination to anticipate and invent it: to suggest modifications of opinion and to explore the domain

of the unknown. The imagination is the engine of anticipation, the tool of experimentation. In the scientific laboratory and in the atelier of art, the imagination is always at work projecting its combinations upon the screen of fact, and embodying the schematic forms of what is not yet accepted as true, but simply proposed as likely, beautiful, or valuable. The whole realm of ideals is open to the imagination, which peoples it with the model results of thought, of action, and of sensibility. The perfect self dwells there; we speak of the order of moral values, as well as that of completed truth, and that of the ideals of beauty. All this exhibits individual invention, personal construction further toward the completeness of the ideal than actual knowledge ever justifies. But its schematic and semblant renderings are tested, altered, and finally confirmed or rejected. Much is constantly added to the store of formulated and accepted knowledge,

available for common judgment and action, by this exercise of the imagination.

It is through these psychological processes that the great communities or mental commonnesses arise — common thought, common morals, common religion. We will now look at the former more closely, reserving the consideration of invention for a later chapter.

Admitting the truth of what we saw above as to the social mode of learning by the child and his indebtedness to his fellows for the material of his self-consciousness, we now see by what processes this material is taken up and assimilated in judgments and imaginative creations of sentiment. The social custom, belief, and practise are absorbed by the individual through his acceptance of the instruction and discipline of his group; thus the mass of tradition and the accumulated knowledge of his ancestors becomes his social heritage; and he renders it again in turn by his judg-

ment and imagination. He cannot rebel, nor refuse to live the common life of knowledge and practise, for his own mental processes confirm and enforce its sanctions.

The truths and norms which are of social derivation and social value are thus reflected into the individual. He has no strictly individual standards; such standards are impossible. He has common knowledge, not private. It is of the nature of his individual judgment to render the results *as if* they were his own discoveries; but they are for the most part not his, but society's.

Into the details of these results of recent research in genetic logic and genetic ethics* I cannot now enter. But it will appear from even such a brief sketch as this that we have in the individual a sort of epitome or recapitulation of

*See, however, the work "Thought and Things," vol. II, and the articles entitled "La Logique de l'Action," in the "Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale," July-November, 1910.

racial history. The rules of thought are the generalizations found useful for the life and intercourse of the race. In them the judgments of countless generations are condensed and formulated. And the individual simply utilizes them as his natural and constitutional means of dealing with nature and with man. He must think in the main as the race has thought, for both he and the principles of thought found in his mind are survivals of the struggle in which both persons and beliefs have been selected for their fitness to cope with the world of things and circumstance.

In this account, however, the other great function, the imagination, must not be overlooked, although it has not yet come into its proper place in genetic discussions, nor have its results had due recognition in theories of social life. The common strain of knowledge is largely exhausted when we take account of the individual's indebtedness to the estab-

lished judgments of his race and group. Thus we account for the structure of his own thought; but his feeling and action do not seem to be subject to the same limitations. In these departments of his life the imagination seems to play a larger role, and to produce results that are not in the same degree subject to revision and reduction to what is racial, customary, and habitual.

To show this we may introduce a form of statement that will serve to show the difference; it introduces a new notion, that of "control." We find that the individual's thought or judgment is "controlled" by the facts he is dealing with, on the one hand, and by the customs, habits, social and disciplinary conventions, and so forth, under which he does his thinking. He cannot use his judgment fruitfully without recognizing these elements of control. He must think in lines that are reasonable and conformable to established rules of logical procedure;

this is required by the laws of thought which are of social origin and utility.

Further, in respect to the actual facts, his imaginations are controlled; he may imagine what he will in his dreams and in his play, but if he would reach conclusions of safe and common acceptance, and of social utility, he must suffer the control of facts upon his beliefs. Only those projections of his imagination, those schemes or suppositions of his speculation, which stand the experimental tests, are left over for permanent acceptance.

In the realm of action or morals, and of sentiment, religious and æsthetic, however, the imagination seems to have greater autonomy. It is true that here too the individual conforms in the main to the established, to the conventional, by subjecting his imagination to the rules of current criticism and established form. But with it all he seems to have in himself certain more final and ultimate standards

in favor of which he may rebel against the conventional and customary. He seems to lose some of his fear of facts, and to regain a certain respect for what he calls "ideals." When he has taken in all the lessons of the actual situation, the knowledge of what is, and has discovered the decisions of the social group, he still does not find himself content. He feels that things ought to be different, that there is a realm of "ought" opposed to that which "is"; standards arise in him which seem to be born in his own inner citadel of selfhood, and not to be subject to the control of mere opinion or of actual fact. He asserts his ideal self over against the actual social self, and says once for all: "This is what I will strive to realize."

In this movement we come upon the operation of a mode of organization of the affective factors of the mental life — feelings and interests — in relative independence of the more intellectual pro-

cesses of judgment and thought.

But it still does not escape the statement that it is also subject to final social control. The individual generalizes his sentiments and ejects them as being of equal value for others also. He expects others to recognize and reverence the ideal he sets up, although they may not accept the individual case which he gives to illustrate it. We all accept in common the ideals of veracity, charity, prudence, integrity; our differences begin when we seek the appropriate single case. We idealize, it is true, but we expect to carry the idealization of others along with us.

Moreover, the hard processes of social control do actually operate, although often outside the individual's recognition. He may not submit, that is willingly, to the decree of fashion or to the current formulations of art and religion; but society is the final resort in deciding the question as to whether or not he shall

finally be considered right. If he can carry society with him by force of the power or beauty of his creations and the force of his protestations, then he wins out; but it is, after all, only with the consent of the social group. On the other hand, however imposing and fine a man's imaginations may be to him, or to the few, still without the *visé*, the confirmation and acceptance, of the social group, they disappear with the man who created them.

To certain of these points we are to return below; they are social aspects of the fact of invention. Here it is our purpose merely to point out the two great modes of socialization, going on in connection with the functions of the individual. One of them is judgment, or thought, by which the individual takes in, ratifies, and reinterprets anew the established judgments, the science and usage of his race. This extends to the customs and habits in which the practical life of the individual is trained. He

thus learns to judge and act according to the judgments and actions of his people.

The other is the imagination, the faculty of reading ahead, of anticipating what may be true and valuable, of prospecting in the goldfields of life. This proceeds on the basis of the established; but it goes beyond it, by setting up ideals and calling on the social set to recognize them. It legislates its results; it ejects its matter into the feeling and conduct of others; it cannot make its way single-handed. As my thought must, if true to me, be true for you too, so my feeling and conduct, if good and right to me, must be good and right for you too; and my æsthetic reverence, if satisfied only by this or that ideal of art, cannot be content while you are still unconvinced.

Here — and this is the lesson for our present study — here we are dealing with psychic or mental functions and processes *par excellence*. Knowledge and feeling bridge the gap between individ-

uals, and flatly contradict the assumption of individualism. The sociological unit considered as a single person is, for all that is intrinsic in the actual social life, a myth. The unit is the "socius," the individual accepting the common knowledge which is constituted by physical and social heredity, and ratifying by his every valid thought the communities of his kind. His knowledges are the outcome of processes of genetic logic of untold antiquity — survivals of what has been of social utility, and of what has been woven by selection into the mental constitution of the race.

So, too, with the sentiments — the morals, the religion, the art — of the individual's production and enjoyment. They give the same testimony. So far as they are more than caprice, analogous to the capricious fancy of the day-dream or revery, they are common possessions, founded in social life and true to it. They show the sanctions of right and

justice, as these gather momentum with the flow of the social current down the passages of history. And even in the standards — in which the mind asserts its supreme prerogative to be an individual and to cherish its own ideals, single handed if need be, to be a martyr for the sake of the integrity of the value it sets before it — even here it postulates a social following, and if long without it, dies for lack of social support.

We have here, then, an inside view of social solidarity in its higher reaches. Sociology cannot distinguish the social act, the state of fact, the situation, by its mere externals; the key is in the feeling, knowledge, and impulse — the community of all these — found in the representative members of the group.

CHAPTER III

Social Competition and Individualism

I

IN our inquiry so far we have dwelt upon the foundation of social solidarity and community; they rest in the essential movement of the growth of the sense of personality. The individual cannot become a full adult and a capable person in any sense without becoming also by the same movement social and solid with his fellows. It then remains to ask: What is still true in the theory of individualism? Is it not based on the facts of struggle, competition, rivalry? And are not these processes which actually run through the social life of man? Is there not really a self-seeking and plotting individual whose first interest

is to serve himself, and who is largely anti-social in his habits and beliefs?

Here again, as in the case of the discussion of solidarity, we go first of all to biology, where the principle of "struggle for existence" is recognized as one of the foundation stones of the theory of evolution. Struggle for existence is real enough in the animal world. It has been pointed out, indeed it was intimated by Darwin himself, that this struggle takes on several positive forms.* There is the struggle of animals to secure their food, or to satisfy other primitive appetites; there is again the struggle the animal must make against climate, floods, adverse conditions of life generally; and yet again there is the struggle against his natural enemies, of which there is always a sufficient number — other animals that prey upon him, plunder him, come into some sort of inimical relation

*Cf. the writer's "Darwin and the Humanities," Chap. ii, pp. 53 ff. Amer. ed.

to him. Struggle with his own kind, struggle with other kinds, struggle with nature. These are the difficulties by which the animal is beset and which he must be prepared to meet. It represents truly enough individualism at its purest: the individual must struggle to exist.

But even in the animal world we find the beginnings of a departure from this pure individualism in the direction of natural collectivism. The animals, as they advance in the scale of life, come more and more into gregarious modes and habits of living. Their instincts take on in family life forms of collective utility which modify one or other of the forms of struggle for existence.

First, there is evidently a lessened intensity of struggle between members of the same species, individuals of the same kind. The family instincts arise — paternal, maternal, conjugal, filial, fraternal — when the family, the first case of col-

lective interest and habit, is established. The family, rather than the individual, becomes the unit of struggle, since the common instincts and habits preserve the individual *only by preserving the family*. The group as a whole, a unit formed of individuals, succeeds the individual as such. This is especially true of man, with whom the family life is not merely instinctive, as with the animals, but becomes an interest of conscious value and utility, intentionally guarded and preserved.

With primitive man there comes also a weakening of the force of the struggle against enemies in general; not indeed a lessened need for protection, but a new way of meeting the need, the way of co-operation. The individual may be powerless and soon become the victim of his enemies, when a little co-operation, a little union for common defense, would turn defeat into victory. So man forms alliances, enters into compacts, makes up

groups, selects leaders, arranges devices for division of parts and labor — all of which secures the advantages of collective action and counsel, replacing the single-handed struggle of the individual. Here again the unit of struggle is not the individual, but the larger or smaller group for whose advantage the result is secured.

As in the case mentioned above, the means, the interest, and the end of the struggle are now in some degree collective.

The same is true more emphatically of the third type of struggle — that against nature. How the animals gain by flocking together and presenting a solid front to the vicissitudes of nature, climate, etc.! The buffaloes of the western plains stand close together when caught in a violent and desolating storm. Scattered, all would perish; united, all escape but the few most exposed. How in nature the adults protect the young, the married

male his mate, the faithful dog his master! All this shows the loosing of the bonds of individualism and the growth of collective interests; not indeed for any theoretical reason, least of all for any reason of personal self-sacrifice and concession to a softened view of nature, but simply and purely because nature has found it to be advantageous to the species. The group becomes the unit, instead of the individual, because it is of profit to the species and the race, that this form of defense and this weapon of offense should succeed the earlier and less effective. A departure from individualism is secured, even in biology, by the operation of the principles of selection and survival.

This is, of course, only to read in the obverse sense, what we have found true of solidarity, in the preceding chapter: growing solidarity results in a cessation or diminution of individualism.

The new point of view now secured is this: there is a shifting, so to speak, of the point of incidence of the struggle. It is no less real, but it is no longer individual: it is now a struggle between groups, not one between individuals. This results in two very important modifications of the conception of individualism.

First, the individual must be fit to unite in the collective life in order that through him it may be saved; but it is also through its salvation that he is saved.

Suppose, for example, a rivalry between two tribes of North American Indians, a real case in the history of North America. Certain tribes are more social, more collective in their habit, more willing to submit to rule and guidance by their chiefs. Such a tribe succeeds in the struggle with rival tribes which have a more individualistic habit. The scattered personal efforts of the less social tribe do not count against the more

organized methods of the other. The result is the survival, in the first instance, of the more collective tribe; but with it goes the survival also of the more tolerant and social individual.

Nature has thus transferred the struggle to the relation between groups. Group selection succeeds individual selection. By the survival of a group in this competition, a type of individual is preserved and encouraged which is less individualistic and more social.

It is necessary to conclude, even at this point of our study, that it is quite impossible to apply the law of biological struggle for existence to the relations of individuals in human society, except in some modified and socialized form. The law applies directly only to the struggle of group with group, of community with community, of civilization with civilization. War still exists between states; but "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" is not the

method of individual competition in organized society.

This principle once admitted — and it is of the first importance in social theory — we find illustrations of it in the higher reaches of social competition and rivalry.

The door is open, second, for the recognition of any sort of individual endowment or habit of social utility which may be seized upon in the struggle of group with group. And we are prepared now, in view of this truth, to give a further interpretation to the higher modes of solidarity pointed out in the earlier pages — still, however, speaking to the text of individualism.

The general principle which should guide us is this: in every case the effective group is constituted by individuals who show a certain type of character. This character is a *tempered individualism*; that is, a tendency to competition, rivalry, self-assertion for personal advancement, *tempered by the requirements*

of the group life as a whole. Over-socialization produces a softened individual and a weakened social life; over-individualism produces a man whose tendencies are destructive of social interests and injurious to the general welfare. It is the balance of these forces, operating in the active situations of life, that establishes the highest society and contributes to the progress of mankind.

Let us see, then, what sorts of individualism remain at work when these principles are recognized and given full value. Here, again, it is the recognition of the facts as we find them, that is exclusively our task.

II

We find, even in the free development of the higher forms of solidarity mentioned above, and of their psychological counterpart — in morals and in common

scientific and practical interests — certain forms of rivalry and competition which bear some resemblance to the biological struggle for existence.

1. In the first place, there is the struggle for a living — a very real thing. Most men have to earn their daily bread, and work — constant, patient, grinding work — is its price.

But the influence of the motives of socialization and collectivism is very apparent among men, even in the most direct struggle for life. The avenues of employment are themselves so “collectivized” that the individual must be socially prepared for his part; and even the reward of his labor is taken in hand by society.

The preparation is very conventional, and in very large part stereotyped. He is classified as carpenter, butcher, clerk, or telegraph operator, only after an apprenticeship, the conditions of which are socially prescribed. This preparation

is evidently part of the price the individual must pay for his living. His freedom of individual action is in part— an ever-increasing part under present-day conditions—being taken from him in the supposed interest of his class. Even in his most valuable traits, his invention, his industry, his resourcefulness, — in all his originalities, priceless gifts to society — he is being deprived of his individual birthright and made to conform to collectivistic regulations.

The same is true of his rewards — they too are “collectivized,” if I may use the term. The wages of toil are decided by a board, inside the secret councils of a trade or labor union: no inferior man can accept less, even though less be still too much; and no superior man more, though more be too little. And upon this collectively determined reward society levies its rates for insurance, benevolence, taxes, etc., countless ways of

reducing what the individual shall finally call his own.

That all this shows the growth of the collectivistic factor is seen as soon as a case presents itself in which a man's individualism leads him into any sort of revolt. The sanctions of collective society come down upon his head. In the matter of earning his bread he must not compete too sharply with his fellows; he must not exercise freely his natural gifts. The most urgent problem of today in the world of labor is that of saving the individual qualities of men, that society may profit by them. By suppressing the free exercise of personality the group suffers a return to mediocrity in all its activities.

It is here, I think, that the sort of mere spontaneous solidarity of suggestion, emotion, and plastic imitation, mentioned above, comes into play without the saving return to intellectual and reasoned individualism. The group becomes a

crowd; the levelling influence of a watchword like "equality" manifests itself; the formulas of imitative custom and convention are taken by all and for all alike. It is a type of collectivism which is in itself but a halfway house to true social organization, having its merits largely in the release it gives from the ruthlessness and brutality of instinct. It is better to follow a bad leader than to follow none; for a good one may succeed the bad. It is better to be a criminal from imitation than from passion or instinct, since the former admits of instruction and reform. But with it all we must maintain that, as compared with what I have called above "reasoned individualism," this is a reversal to a less advanced social type.

In saying, however, that this form of struggle for existence — struggle for work — is tempered by collectivistic motives, in the present condition of the industrial world, I am over-mildly stating the facts.

2. Another sort of competition in social life is what we may call "struggle for place."

The wish, the strenuous pursuit, the feverish desire for place, understood in the widest sense, is a form of personal self-seeking which is one of the familiar and outstanding facts of social life. Romances turn on it, crimes are due to it, lives are wrecked by the various modes of what is generally known as social ambition. It is a peculiar form of self-consciousness — this sense of relative place — which still remains very obscure from the evolution point of view. But it is essentially psychological, and the processes in the individual, by which it gets its force, are fairly plain.

Indeed, the analysis of this powerful motive in some detail will repay us, since it is not dealt with in the general literature of social life, and also because it shows in clear operation the psychological processes already pointed out.

The sense of place is, in its most general form, only the sense of the social situation as each one apprehends it, including his own place in it. It exhibits the movements of the factors of self-consciousness, subjective and ejective, carried to their outcome in actual conditions. What is called "status," political, moral, etc., is the objective side of this consciousness of place.* As the individual grows up he not only recognizes the common elements of selfhood but also the differences of individual persons and classes; and the familiar phenomenon of the clash of wills, with the variety of interests for which individuals of different groups stand, is forced in upon him. The child profits by obedience and imitation, but he also gains in force of character by exercise of will. The prizes of social and personal life become his according as his "status" is such or such — high or low,

*In old societies it is hardened in the rigid distinctions of "caste."

dominant or servile, influential or insignificant.

He also learns to use his intelligence to further the ends of social place and station. He learns to lie, to plot, to conceal his opinions, to pretend, to resort to bluff and braggadocio, in order to carry off the prize of social recognition; for with this recognition come the perquisites of place. He is made leader, judge, referee, counsellor, chief — whatever place of influence or power the situation in question offers. It is instructive and pathetic to see these motives springing up and taking possession of the child in the early stages of his social education.

Such motives as these show themselves, of course, in forms of personal competition and rivalry. One person uses another to forward his own ends; the social group or institution becomes the theatre of conflicting ambitions and plans for advancement; the whole tissue of the social life is shot through with the cross-currents of

social distinction, class, and place. The aristocrat has been defined as the person whom everybody wants to know and who does not want to know anybody; the social parvenue is the opposite — the man who wants to know everybody and whom nobody wants to know.

About this remarkable phenomena of class play the subtlest motives of social life. The sentiments of *esprit de corps*, attachment to class, loyalty to party and race, hostility to the remote and unlike, together with the savageries of social jealousy and hatred, the flow of gossip and backbiting, blackmail, perjury, sham of every sort — these horrid serpents of the undercurrents of society are bred in the subsoil of place and status.

In the midst of it all, not to dwell upon the details, we may isolate the motive of personal individualism. It is true that solidarity precedes and conditions it: without “place” there could be no consciousness of it, nor rivalry with regard to

it. The solidarity of a more spontaneous and loosely knit sort is its platform, its theatre. But in it we see the motive of individual preferment pressing forward to its fulfilment. It reveals the social life as a warfare of competing interests, unmodified by the higher modes of community and self-restraint found in morality, religion, and art. Fortunately, we do not have to think of society as thus deprived of its higher solidarity and community; but in these forms of social rivalry we see what it would be without them — a social hell.

It is clear, too, as it appeared from the point of view of solidarity, that the forces at work are psychological. Just as community and solidarity are built up by the processes of personal selfhood, so are also those of rivalry and competition for place. It is the exaggerated self, the ambitious person desirous of influence, glory, prestige, fame— all attributes of “place”— that comes to the front. These

are psychological movements of the most delicate sort. What could take the place, in the criminal or other courts, of the search for motives, for the inner desire or thought of the person on trial? And apart from the direct love of gain, what motive is more general than that of personal preferment, or love of place, with all the display, vanity, notoriety, and social self-exhibition that this connotes?

No sociological theory based on biological struggle for existence, physical or chemical laws of conservation of energy, physiological and neurological principles of impulse, fixed idea, obsession, etc., can for a moment dispense with these requisite psychological distinctions. The sociologists may classify suicides, and enumerate them; so too he may find out that more of them happen in warm weather than in cold; but how can he tell in any single case the reason why, or point out the determining cause—the despair of the individual, say, who

has lost his social place? Bank robberies, for example, are mostly just alike from the point of view of the actual events of external observation; but each has its sufficient motive; and who can tell, but from an actual knowledge of the feelings and thoughts of the guilty cashier, the case in which the ambition of the wife, stirred by desire for social place, fired the resolution and nerved the hand of the weak official?

3. Struggle for excellence. Finally let us turn to the legitimate motive of personal development and advancement: the ambition, the rivalry, the competition, in what is natural and sane. It is fortunately strong and lively in most men, and is correlated with the recognition of similar motives in others. The disinterested rivalry of sport is one of its models, that of healthy physical exercises another; these tend to the development of the personal powers without detriment to the welfare of others.

One would like to think that, after all, it is by this sort of competition that the great rewards of life are assigned, that the most excellent and developed gifts win the prizes in the long run, and that the weapons of rivalry of place, with the destruction of opponents, are oftener turned against those who use them. However optimistic this may sound, there are still some grounds for believing that the old time motto, "Honesty is the best policy," represents a balance of chances to him who adopts it, rather than the more individualistic sayings, "Nothing succeeds like success," and "The means justifies the end," or the more brutal "Might makes right." At any rate, we may say that upon this nobler personal rivalry, urged on by motives of advancement, personal and social, and gratified by both social and personal excellence, the life of society depends. It is rival thoughts and inventions, rival plans of reform, rival bills

of legislation, rival actions of heroism, discovery, and exploitation, that bring the increments to civilization and renew the moral forces of mankind. Of this more is to be said below under the heading of Social Progress.

III

It remains to point out, however, another case of social struggle and rivalry which manifests itself in those higher modes of intelligent and sentimental development in which the reflective and moral forms of solidarity also show themselves. These latter we have considered under the topic "Social Community," and they are again to be mentioned in the chapter on Progress. There grows up, with these higher sentiments, in the individual, a mode of reflective individualism which exploits itself in opposition to the moralized forms of social life. It is seen in the reflective and intentional

use of one's powers for egoistic and anti-social or, at least, for purely personal purposes. We may discuss it briefly under the heading of Egoistic Individualism, noting at the outset that it shows itself in two marked and distinct forms, to be called "practical" and "theoretical" Egoism.

Practical Egoism may be considered as in a sense a struggle of the individual for himself regardless of others or of society. It refuses to temper itself by the demands of collective life or by considerations of social welfare. It takes on the form of a subtle feeling of "I don't care," when considerations of self-control, sacrifice, generosity, equal rights, and duties are suggested. The individual reserves to himself the right to act as if he were not a citizen, not a parent, not a social fellow — as if, that is, he had no status, or as if he might take his place at will as his self-interest, or the pursuit of gratification, prompted or induced him

Of course the most common and evident instance of this in social life is the man detected in some overt anti-social act, the criminal. But most men who have not been detected feel the presence of this motive and yield to it in certain directions in which the law is supplemented by social opinion in maintaining standards of conformity, and in producing moral and sentimental restraint upon personal action and thought.

Not to dwell here upon the more evident instances, seen in the criminal classes, and in those who violate public opinion and custom for personal indulgence in various practical ways, I shall point out certain larger social exhibitions of it which are now becoming prominent in social life, and which produce results of grave import for the welfare of society.

The voluntary limitation of families is a case in point: the intentional restriction of the number of children. This is

a phenomenon which is just now observable in all civilized communities, and seems to be developed with the development of a life in other respects one of increasing reflection, civic responsibility, and æsthetic feeling. The literary and highly educated classes show it more, perhaps, than others.

Apart from the more purely social causes — considerations such as the severity of the struggle for a living, the increased cost of maintenance of a large number, and the enlarged requirements of education and social place for the children, all of which counsel prudence — there enters into the case no doubt the motive of practical hedonism and self-indulgence. No one supposes that it indicates a diminished fertility or an increased self-restraint. It seems to involve an increased counting of the cost, a diminished sense of social obligation, and a direct willingness to shirk the responsibilities of parenthood with its at-

tendant cares and labors. The father might decide to work harder and exercise more self-denial in his life if the additional child comes; but instead of this he considers the cost beforehand and by practical means avoids the personal burden the enlarged family would entail.

Of course, reflection in these lines is not an unmixed evil. There is no virtue in the cry "race suicide": it is quality and not mere numbers that considerations of eugenics will care for in the future; and the counsel of prudence may often reinforce that of hedonism and self-indulgence. Mere numbers do not help humanity, nor is it desirable that all types of civilization should be preserved — certainly not all types of physical and moral heredity! It is well that the decay of a degenerate race should be hastened by a diminishing birthrate. But nevertheless this does not alter the fact that in the individual the tendency may be — and who can say that in this case or that

it is not? — an indication of a return to the purest individualism and personal hedonism. It may be a sign of degenerating social impulses and of the decay of higher standards of personal morality, rather than one of increased prudence and concern for posterity. From the point of view of the race and of those ends in which biological join with social motives for the extension and advancement of the social whole, it is a tendency which can only be characterized as individualistic and unsocial. From this wider point of view, it is the social body itself, through its expert and established agencies, that should judge which family should be large, and which small, which, indeed, should exist at all and which should not ; it should not be left to the whim, caprice, or pleasure of the individual. Here one sees the important field of the science of eugenics, of which a further word is said below in the chapter on Progress.

Growth in the direction of individual-

ism in modern life, practical in character also, shows itself in the development of industrial and commercial competition. It is especially interesting, since it combines the motives already pointed out in a way that attains *the aims and ends of individualism by using collectivism as means*. The organization of great industrial combinations and of great commercial corporations for the carrying on of business, has, of course, for its end the making of profits. The motive in the individuals concerned is nothing else: the owners must get dividends and the successful exploiters hope to grow rich. This is, then, a decidedly and unmistakably individualistic object. The benefit in view is not, in the first instance, the public welfare nor the welfare of a collective group, but that of the individual; and the methods of organization adopted are those calculated to further the ends of this sort of personal competition.

But these engines of our industrial and

commercial life show remarkable organization; they require united effort and turn on collective struggle. The individual interest of the employees is subordinated to that of the company, which is the instrument of competition. The competitions of individuals within the company or organization are also keen enough — the competition to rise and figure in the control of the concern — but this is limited to the few, the picked men of brains and personal gifts, and they are advanced, not for their good, but for the good of the company. The great majority of the employees are set to tasks of petty and wearisome monotony; they are parts of a whole, cogs in a machine. Their collective work is regulated to the last degree on a collective and non-individualistic basis. The clerk in a Wall Street house must not speculate for himself; the salesman in the magazine has no time nor means to profit by his knowledge and experience to do a side

business in his own interest. So too the competition of the 'smaller houses are stifled by the larger, and the "trust" appears, a gigantic organization of the collective forces of the business community devoted to the ends of individualism.

The effect upon the individual is certainly unfortunate. He feels as never before the impulses of self-assertion, competition, and destructive rivalry; but it cannot be in his own interest: he must identify himself with the interests of the great individual, "the company," and of the men who own or control it. The springs of collectivism, the impulses of generosity, humanity, and charity — the live and let-live sentiments of true sport and commerce alike — are stifled, and in their place arises the sterile and hopeless collectivism of an automatic engine of gain.

We see here the carrying out, in the realm of trade, of the tendency I have

noted above in the individual: the tendency to utilize the weapons of collectivism, the larger possibilities of union and cooperation; but to do so from motives and with ends of a private and unsocial character. As the individual uses the friendship of his neighbor to get his signature on a promise to pay, when his own credit is not sufficiently good, so the corporation uses the lives and efforts of the many, under artificial rules of collective action, to further the fortunes of the few.

A similar but more subtle change in the same direction is coming over our modern life, in consequence of the discovery that collectivism of means is possible in the pursuit of individualistic ends. It is seen in those fields of endeavor and in those interests of a more private nature, in which a balance has to be struck between the two factors. In the organization of charities, for example, in the large cities, much has been gained, no doubt, by what is called "constructive

charity.” The charity society receives and dispenses the gifts of the charitable individuals. It certainly prevents much misplaced giving and discourages vagrancy; its end and its results collectively considered are good. But its results upon the individual are in many respects bad. The immediate responses of his charitable impulse are prevented; the knowledge of the single needy person is made remote and second hand; the beneficiary is classified as “Case No. 10” and treated with thousands like it. The bowels of mercy are succeeded by the wheels of the typewriter, and the ready smile of human sympathy gives place to the curves of the statistician. Every citizen should support organized charity, but he should also reserve some small change in his pockets; and he should every now and then indulge in a debauch of capricious and sympathetic giving, simply to keep alive in himself the springs of divine and spontaneous charity!

In the hardness and ruthlessness of "restricted" competition, in which masses of men are employed in conditions that deprive them of much of their humanity, we see, no doubt, the nearest approach in society to the conditions of biological struggle for existence. The process is analogous, but the motives and results are different.

But in "free" competition the conditions are less biological and more humane. I can do no better at this point than quote the following passage from an earlier article in which the conclusion on this subject is succinctly stated.*

"Free competition, considered as a type operative in commercial and industrial affairs, leaves to the individual freedom of enterprise and a reasonable initiative, in his attempt to succeed. It is psychologically motivated, and rests

*See the article "Rivalry" in the writer's "Dictionary of Philosophy." The distinction between "restricted" and "free" competition is spoken of again below, in Chap. vi.

directly upon the individual's capacity, temperament, and social feeling. The economic motive is tempered and modified by the individual's character. It varies all the way from pure egoism, or love of gain, to the most humane and social concern for others' welfare and success. It appears, therefore, that in free competition we have in operation the factors involved in personal rivalry directed to economic ends. The end in view gives to the agencies of production, trade, etc., a certain interestedness which appears inhuman and is often made the excuse for what is really so; but yet industrial organization is a mode of social organization in which the factors are those essential to social life, and consistent with its other and more altruistic modes. Hence the growth, within the ordinary machinery of industrial economics, of various purely social and ethical features: humane labor laws, hygienic surroundings, libraries and reading-rooms, baths,

lecture courses, lyceums, etc., for the laboring man, together with other more intrinsic arrangements, such as profit sharing, increasing wage, pensions, labor insurance, etc.”

IV

Social competition, then, is in its nature in large measure *sui generis* and psychological. It is not biological. It is a rivalry of minds, not a contest of animal brawn. The following passage expresses in a summary way the writer's conviction on this point.*

“The test of social rivalry is to be found in its motive and end. In biological struggle, we have either the end of personal existence, ministered to by appetite, passion, self-defence, or that of racial continuance, the end of physical reproduction. Biological co-operations, even, have one or both of these ends.

*“Darwin and the Humanities,” pp. 57, ff. Amer. ed.

Individual animals live to propagate, and the species propagates to live. This is the circle of biological ends. The male bird does not understand the motive of his courtship antics, but it is there just the same; the female may not know why she builds the nest, but she is conforming to racial ends. The immediate gratification of impulse and instinct forward the biological process.

“But when we come to psychological, social, and moral rivalry, these things are not so. Social utility tends to replace the utility of instinct. We enter here upon a world of mental and moral motives and ends, which are not exhausted in those of the biological order. The social person acts from motives of display, advancement, prestige, reputation, gain, happiness, honor, all terms which represent a sort of end that cannot be identified with mere continuance or propagation of physical life. Even the most egoistic conduct is partly motivated by

social considerations. The merchant seeks wealth, not for mere food or mere life, but for family prestige and for the larger social amenities. The banker gives a fine dinner, not to gratify his appetite or that of his guests, but 'to show forth his own glory.'

“This appears, also, when we consider the environment in which personal and social rivalry is fought out. It is not a contest to show physical fitness. . . it is rather aimed to meet the conditions of social and moral utility. Society itself is the environment — not the earth and its physical forces — in which the successful rival must show his relative fitness. He must convince men, persuade women, forecast demand, provide supply, anticipate economic and industrial movements, discount beliefs, and weigh customs. This is the arena of social rivalries and advancements. The contest turns upon the individual's adjustment to social situations, upon his attitude toward social

institutions, and his will to acknowledge them; not upon his place or function in the scale of physical life.

“Biological struggle is the means of *selection for purposes of life in a physical and vital environment*. . . Social rivalry, on the other hand, is *the means of selection for mental and moral purposes in the environment of a social order*.”

The outcome of it all, then, is what I have intimated above. There is a sphere of direct competition, a real struggle for existence, between groups of individuals, communities, states, etc., and war is its most evident method of settlement. It is seen in the larger influences which make for racial supremacy and racial decay. The unit is not the individual, but the group; the interest or utility is collective; the organized whole faces the competition with other wholes of interest or utility. Within what is called a “society,” a social group, larger or smaller, the individuals are organized on a more or less

collective basis. Their sociality gives effectiveness to the group. Their morality, sympathy, readiness for co-operation, and restraint — these things it is, the reverse of the individualistic impulses, that arm society with its best weapon.

But the individual still has his life to lead, his way to make, his family to support, his social place and role to secure and maintain. So there are various motives to a return to individualism in certain directions. Every possible combination of the two forces arises and is tried out. Society is in constant flux and flow through the interplay of the two.

To point again our main lesson from the consideration of this topic we may add that it is not the external, physical, biological study of a society that can reveal the real character of these movements: it is the inside study, the study of minds and mental movements — of the opinions, beliefs, passions, motives, of the individuals themselves. The science

of psychology investigates these, both individually and collectively, and sociological study must be informed and renewed by a psychological interpretation of the facts.

CHAPTER IV

Social Institutions: the School, the State, the Church

WE have now found ground for thinking that the communities of interest, and solidarities of organization of actual society replace the individualisms of social theory. The traditional contrast between individual and collective interests is largely artificial and mistaken. The individual is a product of his social life, and society is an organization of such individuals. There is, on the whole, no general antagonism of interests. On the contrary, there is a concurrence and practical identity, at least in those great aspects of life which constitute the utilities of society, and motive the essential actions of men.

This shows itself in relief when we turn

to those outstanding features of the more permanent existence of human society called "social institutions." In them we see the actual working out of the concurrent movement on the part of individual and group.

I

The institution is only the permanent form in which the organization of members of a group embodies itself for carrying on its social function. The school, the state, the church, are typical institutions, thus understood. The essential thing is not the external form, the means by which it accomplishes its end, but the type of collective interest and action it devotes itself to and fulfils. Further, it employs the individual, not in any singular and relatively unusual personal capacity, but in his more typical and usable activities. So much so that the institution lives on the assumption that

one individual may always succeed another in its management and counsels, and that its utility and principal role is seen, not in any individual's presence or interest in it, but in its collective work. Institutions thus become permanent organs of the social life, drawing upon individuals, but not dependent upon them. "The King is dead, long live the King!"

Thus defined, institutions might be considered and classified from various points of view. Our present discussion leads us to make a relatively simple division of them into three classes — the differences being those which embody variations in the united or concurrent action of group interest and individual interest in one and the same institution.

There are institutions for the preparation of the individual for his social place and role: *Pedagogical or Cultural institutions* in a broad sense. But while the interest of the individual is thus con-

served, through his training and introduction into society, that of society itself must be considered over against the undue operation of the individualistic factor; hence the institution of *Government*. It furnishes the control of the individuals, through their own constituted authority. Educational institutions establish and foster social life, governmental institutions regulate and control it. If, then, we consider these two essential utilities subserved in certain institutions described as utilitarian, we may go on to recognize another group of institutions in which the fruitage of it all is reaped and enjoyed — the institutions of sentiment, thought, aspiration, etc., the Church, the League, the Academy. Typical for our present purposes will be the School, the State, and the Church: cultural, regulative, sentimental, respectively.

It is plain that this omits certain great institutions as prominent as these; for

example, the institutions of industrial and commercial life — the factory, the bank, the stock exchange. This is true. But for our purposes these institutions may be passed over, since they do not bring forward the one question with which we are here concerned, that of the relation of the individualistic to the collectivistic motive in society, except in indirect ways. With many others, they are what may be described as institutions of self-maintenance on the part of society, its organs of existence, which are manifold, and which may be indefinitely increased as social life grows more and more complex. Political economy, for example, distinguishes “production,” “distribution,” and “consumption” of wealth; and each of these economic movements has its varied set of institutions. The same is true of the intellectual and moral life of the community. But these are all institutions of mere function; they merely carry on the life of constituted society.

They have not for us the interest that attaches to the three typical institutions mentioned above.

Let me say a word, then, on the role of each of these typical and fundamental institutions, the School, the State, the Church.

These are all fundamental in the sense that they are *requisite to society*, however primitive it may be. We may imagine a primitive group getting along without banks, corporations, or the other means to a life of more or less elaborate complexity; but we cannot imagine them surviving without some sort of instruction to the young, some sort of authoritative control operative as government, and some sort of crude sentiment of reverence and fear of the sort that anticipates and creates the institutions of religion.

II

I wish to point out psychological justification of each of these three funda-

mental institutions, and also the justification that it in turn gives to social life,* considered as both individual and collective.

The institutions of Education are not something simply agreed to and adopted by a society because they seem wise. Not at all. We find in animal companies the beginnings of courses of instruction, so to speak, the first modes of pedagogical leading. The little ones have to absorb the established habits of the species and family, by imitation and practice; and the adults lend themselves to this process by instinctive and acquired activities suited to impress and teach the young.

In human life, also, the family owes

*In another place ("Social and Ethical Interpretations," Chaps. ix and x, I have considered in detail the "sanctions" for action afforded by institutions and found them reducible to three, pedagogical, civil, religious. Under the head of "Sanction" the problem of the relation of "personal" and "social" grounds for action is there considered in detail; it is another way of stating the question of individualism vs. collectivism. The "personal" sanctions, over against the social, are those of "impulse," "desire," and "morality" (or "right"). Cf. also the discussion of Davies, "The Moral Life" (Baltimore, 1909), Chap. v.

its existence, in part, to its function as an educational institution. The mother is the child's teacher. If the young of generation after generation are to be trained in the requirements of actual life, and made ready for the roles of citizen, parent, wage-earner, etc., they must all be drilled in the essentials of social life and habit. They must learn by processes of social heredity, of handing down, from parent and teacher, the lessons of self-control, tolerance, mutual respect, sympathy, co-operation, by which the status of each in his class and place are established and maintained.

After the family comes the school — primary, higher, professional — and with the school those more conventional and informal, but none the less effective, modes of schooling that result from play, imitation, rivalry, social intercourse, and the varied sorts of give and take which actual life affords. All this is the pedagogical side of society, whether it be

formally embodied in school organizations or not.

The general role of the school, then, is one of socialization — so far as it comes within our present topic. Of course, the scope of education does not stop here; the individual is trained in all his powers; the development of the entire self in its integrity is its end, not the suppression of any part. But such is the concurrence between the demands of society and those of individual development, that a common education subserves them both. The individual gets his best personal training in the channels of education which bring out also his social nature and capacities. On this basis society also gains; for in the end, instead of reducing the personal qualities of the individual, instead of suppressing the gifts of genius, she develops them in a way that allows their effective application to conditions as they exist. The untrained, unsocial, purely individualistic and capricious

genius finds his powers useless, because he is not in touch with the forces of a social sort which would make their exercise effective.

In the main we may say, therefore, that the pedagogical institutions of society are socializing and collectivistic. They aim to preserve the type of "socius," or citizen, that the system of things requires. This necessitates the development of the individual along lines that reduce his eccentricity and train his powers into conformity to the standards of social usage and common life. It is still true that in so doing the ends of individual attainment and progress are not lost; for it is from the platform of social attainment and appreciation that the thoughts of the genius, the plans of the inventor, and the schemes of the reformer are projected for the enlightenment and improvement of mankind.

This is true to even a greater extent of the institutions of Government. They

are of necessity conserving and conservative. The need of self-control in the individual is felt first of all in the social body: its utility is social more than individual. The unrestrained exercise of personal powers, of the more instinctive and impulsive sort, might often seem to serve the immediate advantage of the individual. But society points out the wider unit, the larger utility, afforded by cooperation and union. It is for society, then, to secure this by constraining the individuals who do not recognize it. So the exercise of some sort of constraint upon the individuals who need it is the condition of effective social organization. Social control and self-control go hand in hand.

This does not commit us to a theory of government which makes constraint the essence of society; the fundamental motive of social organization is not in my opinion "constraint." On the contrary, all fruitful constraint assumes a sort of

social bond. The need and the advantage of social union and co-operation must be felt in order that its lack or its impairment may come home to individuals. Granted, on the other hand, the growing bonds of social interest and life, then the need of restraining the more unsocial and individualistic tendencies of individuals becomes apparent. Thus arises the recognition of the function of the many to use what means it may to secure the widest and most effective co-operation. No doubt, as many writers have agreed, the earliest forms of constraint were religious and military: religious in the presence of deity, whose commands and requirements must not be disregarded; military in the presence of the enemy, whose moves must be met with a united front. But both alike assume the existence of a growing body of social opinion and usage.

It appears evident, also, from this consideration, that government is not a

matter of formal consent or contract: it is a means of conserving a state or fact and a state of mind already recognized as existing.

If government were only with "the consent of the governed," there would be no need of government. Such a consent is a result, not a cause. The fact of government is the external side of the state of mind by which the individuals of a group come into their status with reference to one another; the status in which the socii reciprocate in varying degrees the feelings of concession and cooperation which growing self-consciousness implicates. This growth is unequal, varying, less or more developed; while the demands of social utility are urgent and compelling. The result is the civil and pedagogical rule, in which the element of authority, with its correlative obedience, plays a conspicuous part.

This element — the enforcing of social rule or law with penalties of various

sorts — embodies itself in institutions of separate form and sanction. This is government. It is the authority of the social group as such recognized as enforced by and upon individuals. It is effective or it could not be established; it is compulsory, or it would not be effective.

Government, then, is the explicit form in which the actual bonds existing in a group are made authoritative and are enforced upon individuals. The greater part of the function of government, however, we should not overlook, is administrative, not coercive. It is mainly an instrument of social procedure, not one of social constraint. There is the consent of the governed in all that in which they do not come into conflict with the established authority; and this covers, for most civilized men, the whole of their lives and all the details of their lives. No one but the law-breaker fears the law.

The form of government changes with development in the form of the social

self-consciousness. The ruder societies show most constraint, and have the most brutal procedure of administration; these are the reflex of the cruder forms of solidarity and community which are not yet tolerant, imitative, or reflective. Legislation is undeveloped, and executive action is autocratic and peremptory.

As society advances, the more psychological factors tend to release the group from its bondage to animal brutality, and from the biological sanctions of appetite, force, individual passion, and ambition; and the more administrative and popular forms of government appear. The stages seem to be in type from absolute despotism, through various modes of constitutionalism, to representative government and democracy. How far democracy succeeds seems to depend upon the relative social and political virtue of the people. If government is ever to dispense with an authority that may, on occasion, assert itself without the ratifi-

cation of its decrees by the popular voice, it must be when and because that voice is not necessary.

In respect to government, as in respect to theories of society, we find the more reflective forms of solidarity, on the one hand, and of individualism and hedonism, on the other hand, showing interesting modes of development. Socialism is, in its general meaning, the outcome of extreme collectivistic theory; and it aims at the establishment of a corresponding social practice. It desiderates the reduction of all "status" to one, that of resolute and assenting equality; the function of government being in turn limited to pure administration, police activity replacing the military. It represents the Utopia of collectivism, since it assumes a humanity that is both willing and able to dispense with competition and inequality, and a virtue that requires no sanctions beyond those imposed in the processes of education.

As an ideal, no doubt, it merges in that

of pure democracy; but as a fact it would seem to fit only upon a Utopia of dormant contentedness and lifeless mediocrity. For the rewards must always be to the few who are strong, and the fair will always go to the brave. Only the absence of inducement would account for the absence of rivalry and struggle; while the absence of inducement would mean the decline of those faculties of invention and restless thought and endeavor by which the glory of man is established and the forward movement of society is secured.

With the theoretical development of socialism goes a corresponding development of theoretical, and sporadically also of practical, individualism in the form of a return to free and untrained nature, the creed of a more reflective anarchism. In socialism, government as authority is practically to be abolished because it is not needed; in anarchism, it is really to be abolished because it is not wanted. In

the one, the socializing movement goes on to perfection; in the other, it is undone. "Why," says the theoretical anarchist, "should I be governed? Why should I submit to any authority at all on the part of my fellowmen? I am as good and as wise as the next man. I will be free, unrestrained; and I will show the superiority of the individual man by blowing up the social 'leviathan' with bombs!"

It is needless to remark that this is not a theory of government, but a protest against it: not a view of society, but a revolt from it. It shows the motive of egoism in a refined quasi-philosophical form. Its extreme anti-social meaning is expressed in the term often used by its theoretical advocates, "nihilism."

The two sorts of institution now spoken of, pedagogical and political, belong to the utilitarian and functional side of society: they are not luxuries, but necessities. Citizens must be controlled, and the laws of good citizenship must be

administered and enforced. But besides these institutions, which are strictly utilitarian in their nature, we find another group in which the development of the psychological motives are conspicuous in character and in beauty. The most marked of these, because the most constant and regular in form, are the institutions of Religion.

In an earlier passage (Chap. ii, v) I have pointed out that the community of interest of the collective life goes beyond the establishment of custom and law, and embodies itself in the individual's morality. The "right" is for him not a private rule of life, not an individualistic impulse, but a public and general "imperative," uttered by his moral nature, and binding upon all the social fellows alike. It is rooted in the general custom and law of the group, but it reinterprets these in universal form as ideal rules or norms of conduct.

This is due to the movement of self-

consciousness outlined above, which goes a step further. The tendency to read the self into others — to “eject” it as a general self — has its counterpart in the movement to read the self, as carried on to perfection, as a personal ideal. This ideal is a self of perfect morality and goodness; and as being not yet attained by the individual, it is embodied in the great Person, the Deity.

The Deity is the ideal person of the imagination, considered as objective and actual, and as having personal relations with the real persons of the group. It is the social fellow carried to its highest term. As I have expressed it elsewhere,* “The deity shows the growth of normal social relations and reflects their character. . . . He is the controlling spiritual presence, the voice, the oracle of the group. . . . The tribe’s deity is, in this important sense, the tribal self. . . . The ideal that hovers

*See “Darwin and the Humanities,” Amer. ed., p. 101.

over the personal self of the individual and impregnates his spiritual life, is one with the tribal or national self-consciousness. 'Great is Diana of the Ephesians' is not only the formula of personal religious experience, it is also a proclamation of civic and national unity; and both are possible in one because in the process by which the individual idealizes his life in community with others, he also, in common with them, creates a communal or national ideal."

The institutions of religion are the means by which this motive of idealization takes permanent form in the life and work of the group. Religion is a conservative force in social life, since it proceeds upon the established morality and enforces it. At the same time, it appeals to the sentiments of personal loyalty and attachment to ideals which the group life postulates and attempts to enforce. Thus considered, religion is a socializing and

collectivistic factor in the whole complex of society.

But it has its individualistic side as well. The ideal of self-perfection is not solely a social ideal, nor does the social embodiment most fully express it. It is first of all personal. Religion is contrasted in this respect with morality. Morality is social to the core, inasmuch as its standards are those of custom and law, idealized it is true, but still treated as if real in the actual social order. Religion, on the other hand, does not expect to find its ideal in the social order; but it projects it beyond the actual into the being of a Deity apart, a personal Self who alone knows and is the ideal. The Deity, when all is said, is a single person, an individual; he is the source of morality and of all ideals; and in him the springs of sentiment are found. "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect" is a moral maxim, but it is also a religious creed. It assumes a

source of law and authority, a Ruler in the realm of values, existing beyond the socially established and common life.

So the religious spirit goes beyond the religious institution as it exists, recognizing in it only the means of revelation, the organ of the One who issues decrees of divine right, the embodiment of what the Deity has been pleased to reveal. The Deity himself is beyond the church. And in so far as the individual himself becomes inspired, the mouthpiece of the divine revelation, so far he must himself stand apart and perhaps lead a movement to reform religion. He must work miracles, establish new rites, start a new church.

In religious institutions, therefore, we seem to find the collectivistic and individualistic motives singularly combined. They conserve and enforce the social values, as embodied in the current and established morality; they are thus collectivistic and social. On the other hand,

it is in the religious life that the most advanced and refined type of private, personal, and individualistic experience is attained. And the ideals of personality, thus individualized, are projected into a realm — a Kingdom of Heaven — ruled by an Individual, a perfect and singular being. Even in polytheistic religions there is a supreme ruling deity above the rest.

This final individualism of the religious life shows itself in the fanatic, the seer, the religious mystic. The “vision” of such a man is the outcome of a type of reflection which goes beyond its social origin and may on occasion antagonize it. Who is more dangerous to society than the anarchist who has a “revelation,” or the criminal who has a divine mandate of vengeance or retaliation? The last egotisms of perverted self-consciousness may receive divine confirmation and warrant in the mystic religious trance; and the broodings of diseased imagination

may take on, in this breeding-place, the form of inspiration from the unseen.

It should be said, however, that such manifestations of the religious life are extreme and very partial movements. The religious experience is normally developed within the control of social and moral motives. The religious spirit seeks social embodiment and normally finds it. It is only by a loss of balance, in which a diseased subjectivity, or a starved life of mysticism, exhibits itself, that the egoistic and individualistic types of religious experience come into prominence.*

It is in this sense, then, that religion and art, institutions of sentiment in general, may be called "luxuries" of life. They do not seek justification in practical utility or direct advantage; they are the flowering of human feeling and aspiration

*Cf. the writer's article, "Religion (Psychology of)," 4. b. in the "Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology," Vol. II, where the "unity of religious experience" is insisted upon in contrast with the treatment of James, in his "Varieties of Religious Experience."

in products peculiarly their own. They represent the social, and spring from it, and are thus an index and measure of social values and social attainments; but they go beyond the socially attained, and give new form and force to the demand of the individual for a full and complete personal life.

In them, indeed, we find manifestations which are rooted in social happenings, and which show a historical development with the body of sociological facts. But they cannot be understood by the methods of external sociological observation. They are *par excellence* matters of the individual's personal inner life. Morality, religion, art return into the realm of private motive and private appreciation and valuation. It is only in their common manifestations, which follow social channels, and in their power to secure social results, that sociology takes cognizance of them. The comparative history of religions, for example, presents

the dry shells of a departed religious life except so far as the analogy of a current living experience can give it life and color. It must be interpreted by a psychology of personal religion.

CHAPTER V

Social Invention and Progress

IN the foregoing pages we have laid emphasis upon the development of the collectivistic motive. We have shown how, at each stage of personal growth, the community of individual thought and action embodies itself in social solidarity and in social institutions. At the same time, it has appeared that the motive to singularity and individualism is not entirely lost or subverted in the social movement, but that it has its varied stages of manifestation in practice and theory alike.

It now remains to ask how these motives are to result in a continuous and coherent social movement — how, that is, a movement sufficiently integral and

continuous to be called "progress" can arise and go forward.

I

We are aided again here by the resort to the growth and progress of the individual in those aspects of his mental life which bring him into social relationships. We have already seen that he absorbs imitatively and obediently the matter of the social life and habit of his group. The questions then arise: Are imitation and obedience all? Is there no further process than that which conserves the social tradition through imitative reproduction? Is there no function of invention and discovery? If there is, where does it reside?

These questions are extremely important. They bring final emphasis to the point of view already adopted in these pages — the point of view which resorts, even for sociological interpretation, to

the results of social psychology. For it is in those modes of social solidarity in which invention is present that social progress is to be discovered, and invention is a matter of individual psychology.

We have seen in the chapter on Solidarity that the earlier and simpler forms of solidarity and community do not admit of progressive change. There are no motives to change either in the collective life of animal instinct or in the spontaneous imitation and contagion of the life of the crowd and the mob. The instincts are stereotyped, fixed by physical heredity. The type of common action which results is relatively non-adaptable, inflexible. If the conditions are much changed the creatures perish. The gregariousness of mere imitation and emotional contagion is also unprogressive; the crowd is said to "lose its head": it becomes destructive and violent under the influence of suggestion. All this is the reverse of the continuous and pro-

gressive change by which a new and more complex type of social life is evolved.

Accordingly, it is to the higher and more organized psychological processes that we must look for anything from which regular and progressive change could arise in the social body; that is, it is to the processes which result in what we have called above "reflective" solidarity and community. In other words, the laws by which biological progress and change are produced — resulting in the more perfect organism and the more adapted reactions to nature — are not the laws of social progress as such. There must be distinctive psychological processes at work.

Natural selection, for example, does not secure social progress, although it may preserve and extend the group in which a social type is present. The type that is worth selecting and extending arises *within* the group by processes of internal organization. Socialization within the

group gives the *raison d'être* for the natural selection of the group.

Further, the gains accruing to social life are not handed down by physical inheritance. We do not find that the generations in order succeed to the achievements made from age to age through processes of heredity. The babe of to-day, for example, is probably about what the babe of prehistoric times was, apart from the instruments and means of civilization, such as speech, writing, etc. Each generation learns the same things over again, and so comes into the heritage by social transmission. The individual inherits these things by processes of instruction and imitative absorption, not by processes of physical descent.

It is our part, then, to inquire into the psychological processes by which social progress and personal development are together and continuously achieved.

In the individual, invention is as natural as imitation. Indeed normal imi-

tation is rarely free from invention! The child has his imagination as well as his perception, his thought as well as his mere recognition, his reverence for the ideal as well as his sentiment for the actual; and in all these functions, imagination, thought, idealization, he shows himself inventive and original. The imagination goes ahead of the actual details of the given situation and projects its forms upon the actual. The new "scheme" of possible value is prepared in the imagination for the tests of actual life; and in the result the new idea may be finally established.

The processes of experimentation, characteristic of the deliberate research upon which science depends, are similar in type to this use of the imagination and continuous with it. The hypothesis or proposal is suggested by an act of the imagination based upon knowledge; and it is brought to the test in the laboratory of the experimenter or by

the observation of the naturalist or explorer.

In the higher reaches of feeling, sentiment, and moral appreciation, the same procedure appears. The imagination idealizes the situation, in respect to beauty, goodness, utility; and the rules or norms of life and conduct arise according to which poetry and practice alike, the felt value and the explicit act, are brought into conformity to the ideal. So morality and religion are born.

In all this there is invention. It is a process of discovery, of achievement beyond the data of mere imitation and absorption of the current social tradition and custom. The child, the poet, the man of science, the religious prophet, all alike use the imagination; by it they suggest to nature and to society new forms of truth, beauty, value, which may be made available for the social store.

In all the processes of social absorption and imitation, therefore, we find that

the individual thinks and imagines in his own way. He cannot give back unaltered what he gets, as the parrot does. He is not a repeating machine. His mental creations are much more vital and transforming. Try as he will he cannot exactly reproduce; and when he comes near to it his self-love protests and claims its right to do its own thinking. So the new form, the personal shading, the embodiment of individual interest, the exhibition of a special mode of feeling — all these go to make his result a new thing which is of possible value for the society in which it arises.

In consequence of this, the relation between individual and society takes on a new and interesting form. The individual becomes the source of the new ideas, the inventions, the formulas of legislation and reform. The individual is the only source of novelties of thought or practice; and it is from the individual that society learns them. They are “gen-

eralized," discussed, pared down, made available in form and content, by social processes, and then finally passed over to the domain of the accepted and socially selected.

The aeroplane, for example, is now passing through this process of social generalization; it is being made actually available for social utilities, the principles of successful flight having been thought out and demonstrated by single men. Socialistic theories in politics are in like manner having their testing and generalization, to make them available in national life. In morals, the laws of marriage and divorce, the legal procedure of criminality, the determination of sanctions and penalties, all show the processes of social assimilation of the ideas and proposals of single thinking men.

There are limits, of course, to this assimilation. In its nature society is conservative. Its form results from long racial processes of gradual adaptation and

compromise. It represents a complex state of equilibrium, a balance of opposing and concurring interests. So every new idea, every project of reform or change, has to fight for its acceptance, to struggle for existence, to show itself adapted to social belief and use. Not all alike are available for social generalization. Those which do show themselves available must not be too antagonistic to the established, or too remote from it. They must be, as it were, children of the present, made of the same material and recognizing the same realities, physical and social, as the thought already adopted and sanctioned in society.

It is, in fact, the slight variations which are more usually fruitful. Seed-thoughts, epoch-making discoveries, are slow in making themselves felt. If they are too abrupt, too radical in the demands they make for change, they rest dead and fruitless, perhaps always — certainly un-

til some moderate thinker restates them in form more assimilable to the social store.

There is, therefore, a process of give and take between the individual and society by which what we may call the consciousness of the social body as a whole is built up. Society absorbs the thoughts and examples of individuals, and makes them socially available; then the individuals of successive generations receive them by social inheritance and reinforce them in turn. But in this process the individuals again produce variations, exceptional proposals of thought, action, and sentiment, and the social body again reacts to their suggestions. Society takes the "copy" from the individual, as the individual takes it from his fellows; makes it its own as the individual makes his own the lessons of self-consciousness; and then ejects it back into the individual as the person also has ejected it into his fellows about him. Thus the concurrent

growth goes on: the individual feeds upon the current custom, science, morals of his time and group, and society feeds upon the thoughts, inventions, plans of social welfare excogitated by individuals.

This process, taken as a whole, is what we mean by social progress. It is the normal and continuous growth of social organization concurrently with the person's progress in individuality. Its direction is that of the growth of personal self-consciousness; its states are those of ascending self-realization; its ideal is that of the self of the socialized individual. It is progress in the concurrent development of the collectivistic and individualistic factors to which society owes its very existence. Whatever tends to disturb this concurrence, this oneness of ideal and aim, marks retrogression, since it tends to mutilate the individual by separating him from the social body, or to destroy society by depriving it of its original minds. Pure collectivism could

not be progressive, since it would lack incentive and creativeness--new thoughts, ideas, plans. Pure individualism could not be progressive, since it would dissolve the achievements of social history, and leave the person a human atom, isolated and uninstructed.

II

This does not mean that different directions of progress are not possible; they are, since different motives of the whole human being may come into play predominately in this circumstance or that. One group may be conspicuous for its practical talent, another for its conquests in science, a third for its ingenuity of invention. These would show progress severally in industrial, scientific, and material lines. Another culture may be predominately sentimental, embodying its sensibility in remarkable products of art and literature, or in movements of refined and sympathetic social respon-

siveness; this again is true progress, since it represents one great aspect of human endowment working out to perfection. Again, we may find a people given to remarkable moral and religious striving, subordinating all the other great interests to the working out of problems of moral, political, and social life: this is certainly progress too. In short, each of the great activities of humanity demands and embodies a sort of one-sidedness in attaining its fullest development: a single-eyedness, so to speak, which accounts for the relative neglect of opportunities and responsibilities which to others seem all-important. But the essential movement of idealization, of completion, of the realization of the highest, must go on; and in each of these great aspects of human attainment it cannot go on without that essential union of collectivistic and individualistic interests and motives which keeps the self of the individual well within the larger self of the group.

There can be no social progress that is permanently and progressively destructive of true individuality; and there can be no proper individual development that is, in the long run and on the whole, destructive of the interests and welfare of the group.

It would be an interesting task to describe in some detail the characteristics of the leading nations of to-day, with reference to their type of culture, to the direction, that is, of the progress of each within the limitations of our definition. Admitting that they are all progressive and making no comparisons that would serve to arouse disputation, I think it would be safe to say that Anglo-Saxon civilization is characterized by great moral earnestness and the genius for self-government that goes with it; while it lacks a correspondingly high development of artistic sensibility and creativeness. The Latin mind, on the contrary, notably as illustrated by French culture,

shows remarkable superiority on the side of sentiment, and all that sentiment creates — literature, fine art, personal taste and refinement. But on the other hand, the Latin peoples do not seem to produce the great men of action, the statesmen and explorers, that have made Great Britain famous; although in this respect, of the Latin peoples, France seems to be in no real sense second class. In the domain of scientific thought these two types of culture seem to be well balanced. We find in France and England alike the highest flowering of genius of this sort, in each a galaxy of great mathematicians, naturalists, physicists, philosophers.

No doubt this question is too complicated for more than casual illustration here, but the comparison does illustrate the conditions both of unity and variety in human progress. The moral qualities of the British, exercised in practical conditions, beget the inventiveness and

knack for success' of the Americans; and the artistic greatness of the French make Paris the centre of instruction and inspiration for all the world. While in German culture we find a speculative impulse and a touch of mystical idealism which serve to ennoble life and achievement, at the same time that they somewhat impair the results in departments of thought which require exactness, sobriety, and moderation. To the English the problems most worth while are practical problems; to the French they are æsthetic problems; to the Germans nothing short of world problems, problems of universal synthesis, long occupy the attention: to them we owe the great systems of speculative thought.

In each of these cases, it need not be said, we have the background of an ordered civilization, a traditional culture, in which the motives of the essential concurrence of individual and society are worked out on lines largely the same.

The differences show themselves in special achievements, due to special racial gifts, summed up in what we know popularly as the genius of the people.

Apart from such differences, however, we may expect that the fixed factors of progress will be operative in the future as in the past; factors which in their larger bearings are at present before the world, in a greater or lesser degree, for discussion. The vital question of war and the substitutes for it; that of the elimination of disease; and that of the regulation and welfare of population; these and other great questions are reflections of the fundamental problem of progress.

War is a fact of group struggle and selection; disease mental and moral is a sign of mal-adjustment or lack of adaptation; and the supply of population and its quality are functions of marriage and heredity. The one inclusive question upon which all these problems turn

is this: Is it possible to substitute reflective and intentional, conscious and deliberate, control of human interests for the more biological and brutal processes which still remain in force? In other words, is it possible to assist and hasten the social movement out of its bondage to the physical — physical force, hereditary weakness, sexual incontinence — by plans in which well-chosen social means will take the place of the destructive processes of natural selection?

I say “assist and hasten” nature, since it is not in any sense to come into conflict with nature. We have seen that the course of development has been already in this direction. Collectivism, reflective solidarity, the pursuit of moral and social ends — this is the direction that nature itself pursues in social evolution. We may, therefore, lend a helping hand to the car of progress by utilizing the resources of thought, invention, and

morality, and bring in a period of better things.

In fact it does not take a prophet to see that these measures belong to the future. The growth of international law has been rapid, and arbitration as a measure of adjustment of national controversies without resort to force is not so remote an ideal as it once was. Even if not actually abolished, still group competition, in the form of appeal to arms, is being more and more restricted and limited.

In the warfare against disease and against the forces of nature in general, mind and science are showing their extraordinary power. The advances in medicine and practical invention, both serving to extend the immunity of man from the perils of his environment, are the amazement of the new century.

In the other field, that of improving the population by control of heredity through preferential pairing, the future

has, in my opinion, even greater results in store for society. An artificial humanitarianism and a sentimental respect for the so-called rights of life and reproduction, has so softened the heart of the civilized peoples, and dulled their reflection, that in this matter of capital importance a *laissez faire* policy has been universal.

What is more important to a race or group than the sort of children produced by it? Yet both in the pairing that supplies the new generation and in the treatment of the young thus produced, no adequate regulation or control has ever been devised by society — not to say enforced. Weaklings, diseased persons, mental and moral incapables are not only freely produced, but they are allowed in turn to perpetuate themselves by further reproduction. Surely it is high time for society, as it becomes conscious of the principles of its own development and of its resources of control, to address itself directly to the pro-

blems of eugenics.* A movement in this direction is upon us which is destined to do more for humanity, both in its radical provisions and in its beneficent results, than possibly any other that society has seen.

The parent must support his children, educate them, have physicians for them, leave his fortune to them; all these things we expect of a true father or mother. But these things are all done for the child only after he is born: only after the parent, perhaps by the grossest carelessness or neglect, or by a wilful and criminal self-indulgence or indifference, has endowed the child with an incurable disease or crippled him for life with a heritage of insanity, idiocy, or crime. We do not allow an individual to infect his neighbor with his disease; why should he be allowed to infect his infant? We do all in our power to prevent a man

* The name given to this new science by its founder, Sir Francis Galton.

from poisoning himself; why should he be allowed to poison the next generation? It is the duty of society who owns the young generation, even when unborn, in a sense that is not possible of any individual, to determine the sort of generation it shall be; and it is no less its duty to make it the best it can be.

I have no space to discuss the theoretical grounds of eugenics. I can only suggest certain practical directions in which the present lack of control on the part of society may be remedied.

A distinction must be made and maintained between mere sexual intercourse as such and effective reproduction. Society is itself drawing this distinction more and more explicitly, as the diminishing birthrate shows. There is no reason that an adequate control of effective reproduction should extend to the attempt to eradicate or suppress the sexual function. It is useless to attempt this. It is only necessary to limit and direct the re-

sults by making the function ineffective in certain cases. Conditions may be imposed for the control of fertilization in such a way as to regulate births, but not to prevent the gratification of the legitimate and imperative sexual instinct.

Nature, too, makes this distinction. Most cases of sexual connection are unproductive in any case; it is quite natural and feasible to regulate this disparity and make it sure that certain special cases shall always be unproductive — cases determined by society and not left, as now, to mere chance or to the caprice and selfishness of individuals. The cause of each new birth does not reside in the normal function of one parent alone, but requires that of both. Any measure which will render either parent incapable will serve the ends of limiting and selecting the newborn.

Of practical measures for preventing the birth of the unfit, those which regulate the conditions of marriage are quite in-

effective,* since they place a premium on unmarried unions — a resort that needs no encouragement. The only course that would be actually and permanently effective is some process of sterilization of the persons of undesirable heredity which would not, however, destroy the sexual function itself. With the progress of medical and surgical science, and the corresponding recognition of this social need, no doubt eugenic progress will be in this direction. Once the method of restriction and elimination is discovered, society will adopt standards and procedures for securing the rapid and wholesome improvement of its members. And no doubt with this will come moral and social conditions in which the troublesome and difficult problems of marriage, divorce, sexual relations, etc., will be more reasonably treated than is possible

*As in certain states of the American Union, In one of the states, however, Indiana, there is "surgical sterilization of certain classes of the unfit." (From a private letter of Prof. W. M. Daniels.)

at present. For there is no other department of life in which the motives and immediate interests of the individual seem so often to be at variance with those of society.

In this matter of progress, it should be added, we find confirmation of our principal thesis. Society and the individual are not two entities, two forces acting separately, two enemies making forced and grudging concessions each to the other. On the contrary, they are the two sides of a growing organic whole, in which the welfare and advance of the one minister to the welfare and progress of the other. There is but one human interest, when all is said, and this is both individual and social at once.

CHAPTER VI

*The Philosophy of Business**

IN this chapter I wish to show certain of our principles at work in practise. It will also present to business men some of the reasons that justify their calling. It should serve as well to show that business has an essential place in the functions of society.

I shall divide what I have to say into certain subordinate parts, discussing the Nature of Business, the Method or Logic of Business, and the Morality or Ethics of Business.

I. THE NATURE OF BUSINESS

What, then, is "business," understood so generally that all sorts of business may be included in the term?

*An article written for a business journal. I present it here because it shows the application of certain principles, in a department of life that is little written about.

The most general answer to this question defines business as the practical side of political economy; that is, it is the economy of society in actual operation, while the science of political or social economy is the theory. But business is much older than the theory of it. Men entered into business relations with one another long before they discovered the laws of trade, supply and demand, distribution, etc. So the practical business man is an older figure in the history of society than the theorist who explains how it is done.

Still the theory is based upon the actual operations of social life, and we have in the great headings of political economy the points of view from which business may be profitably looked at. These headings are three, as the subject is usually treated: Production, Distribution, and Consumption of wealth or value. And it is under one or more of these headings that all the activities of the business

man — apart from the mere machinery of his calling — may be considered.

But these aspects of the economy of social life, or of wealth, are not of equal importance in the calling of the business man. It is evident from the most superficial inspection that he is principally concerned with the production and distribution, hardly at all with the consumption, of wealth. His interest ceases when the champagne passes into the steam yacht, or when the locomotive is delivered to the railroad: the business is then completed. And the reason for this is not difficult to point out; it is because the methods and processes of consumption are relatively simple and constant, much more so than those of production and distribution. How to produce a locomotive, and how to sell it in the face of competition — these are very complicated problems. What to do with it when it is once had in hand — that is very simple and plain. So with things of utility

generally: their utility is evident, the processes of giving them this utility and of placing them in the hands which have need of them, that is difficult and indirect.

I think it is safe to say, then, that business has to do with the production and distribution of valuable things: money, utensils, anything for which there is a demand in society, or on which society or some individuals of it set value. To produce such things in response to the demand, and to distribute them to those from whom the demand comes, is the undertaking of business. This defines business from the side of society; business is a social function.

There is, however, another side to the question, a side of equal importance, if business is actually to be done: the side of the individual's motive and interest in transacting business. It is very well to point out the role of the business men in the general functions of social life, and

to show the utilities they serve in social economy; but it remains to ask why men care to do business, what they get out of it. This brings up the question of personal economy, or motive for action, on the part of the individual.

Of course, we cannot say that a man does business for the general welfare, and to serve the interest of the distribution of wealth. On the contrary, his interest is much more direct and less collectivistic. He does business to get a living, to make money, to produce wealth in a different sense from that of political economy. Whose wealth? — becomes to him the important question. Not the wealth certainly of his competitors, at a loss to himself; not that of society in general, when he himself spends without reward! This would be philanthropy, not business. In fact he gives up the business when he finds it is being conducted at a loss.

This is true: and it is just here that the principal philosophical problem of busi-

ness arises, carrying with it ethical and practical problems also. It is the problem of relation between the public utility and the private utility involved in business. It may be put plainly in this way: is business justified which is pursued for personal gain, when it is known, let us say, to be of public damage and loss? Is the calling of the business man, that is, so separate and remote from the social welfare that it can be purely selfish and egoistic, purely individualistic, and not at all collectivistic in its motive and end?

This, as I have said, is a very important question, and one on which philosophers and moralists may well disagree. Current theory, however, based on the results of social psychology points the way to a fairly clear view in the matter. It is to the effect that there is usually, in most of the recognized forms of business activity, no fundamental contradiction between the two sorts of utility: because in the long run, the pursuit of a living

by the individual through making profits, or getting wealth in business, is also a means of advancing the general welfare. The social accumulation of wealth reflected in advancing standards of living, in general devices and instruments of culture, in the support of the institutions of civilization, etc., depends upon the success of individuals in making a living. Not so much upon the exceptional success of some in accumulating large fortunes, but upon the relative success of the average, of the mass of the business men, including the producers, the laboring men, the artisans, in their respective activities. This conclusion is so interesting, that I may be allowed to state certain of the principles on which it rests.

In the first place, it is necessary that the great activities of production and distribution should be economically as well as efficiently performed. This need appeared early in the history of societies and resulted in the actual division of labor.

It was better that a special part be assigned to each in which he can become proficient and serviceable for all, than that everybody should attempt to do everything.

In this division of labor there appeared the class whose part it is to stand between the producer and the consumer, and also between the raw material and the finished article, and administer the product: to distribute, advertise, distinguish between modes and sorts of value, and bring the utility to its proper point of application. All this is the role of the business class. They arose to economize, not to waste the resources of society. And their living and accumulation is a part of the price society pays for this economical arrangement. They are not, of course, to live for nothing — otherwise society would have to support them. They are to be actuated by the motive that actuates men generally in the world of economics; they are to take up business

because it attracts by its offer of profits. Their self-interest makes them efficient and successful; but their efficiency and success are to the same degree necessary to society. In other words, to put it in technical terms, there is "concurrence" between the individual and the social motive and utility.

A second principle involved is this: there is always in progressive society a balance between what are known as the individualistic and collectivistic tendencies. This I have already pointed out in an earlier chapter.

In political life we see this in the growth of socialism on the one hand, and the reaction to individualism in the extreme forms of anarchism and nihilism, on the other hand. The collectivist wishes to make society the one agent and the social welfare the exclusive motive. The individual must submit to the regulations of his union, his order, his class. He must yield his right to judge for him-

self and to strive for individual advantage, and accept the average and uniform result aimed at by the group.

On the other hand, this is criticized by those who take the individualistic point of view. The individual loses his initiative, his talents are unemployed, he is reduced to the average, and society itself loses its best results.

A balance between these two factors must be secured and retained. Society has interests over and above those of the individual: but to sacrifice the ambition, competition, and rivalry of individuals is to sacrifice the progressive factor in society. There must be left a certain freedom of initiation, a range of invention and spontaneous struggle for profits, to stimulate the individual to his best effort. This will then result in the progress and welfare of society as a whole.

I cannot take further space to discuss these two great principles: the need of having the business man, on the ground

of economy and efficiency of social life, and the need of personal competition and rivalry in the interests of social progress and welfare.* But it will be evident that in establishing them we have laid down the foundations of a philosophy of business. For the business man, as a class, becomes the agent of society, and the competition of individual men is the means and method of business. In showing that society requires and demands both the man and his methods, we justify business.

We come, then, to certain conclusions. Business is the necessary avenue of social economy, in the production and distribution of wealth, carried on by a specially fitted and recognized class of men, who devote themselves to it from motives of personal gain. What these personal motives are more particularly, and what limits should be placed upon them, are the topics of our further brief discussion.

*The second of these points has been presented in the preceding pages of this book.

II. THE METHOD OR LOGIC OF BUSINESS

It should at once suggest itself to one at all familiar with business that competition plays a great part in its method. Indeed so evident is this that many have attempted to make business competition merely an instance of what in the biological theory of evolution is known as struggle for existence. This conception is, however, no more than a fruitful analogy, since competition differs from biological struggle in important ways, as we have already seen.

The most important difference is seen in the fact that some degree of co-operation or organization characterizes business competition. There is no business, except the most simple and elementary, such as the "swapping" of marbles, that does not involve a certain amount of union and co-operation on the part of individuals.

Competition and co-operation, then, are

the salient features of business method.

The important role played by competition appears on the surface. If there is a chance of making money, and there are many men able to take advantage of the opportunity, then these men compete for the chance. It results in a certain rivalry, which not only affects the men themselves, but also changes the social conditions in very interesting respects.

In the first place, the competitors are put on their mettle to succeed, and this introduces a great variety of means and methods of securing success. The best and most economical processes of production, the most effective means of display and advertisement, the most persuasive and convincing appeal to the persons having the need and making the demand, and the stimulating of new demand by creating belief in the desirableness of the product — all these are important chapters in the theory of business competition. They involve the prin-

principles of the psychology of doing business; the use of the mind and the appeal to desire. There are, however, certain less evident points which I wish to emphasize.

It is part of the theory of competition in economics that it should be "free," that is, that many men should be able to enter the lists on about the same terms, and with about equal opportunities.* In such competition as this, there are evidently enormous advantages to the consumer as well as to the producer. The need to meet the competitor on equal terms spurs on the producer to make the best article at the lowest price; otherwise his rival is favored by the consumer. This results in real social and economic gain; for the articles produced are of greater aggregate value — more durable, more effective, more reliable — and the distribution and use of these rather than others is a corresponding gain to the consumer.

*Cf. the brief remarks on "free" competition in Chapter ii above.

From this point of view, then, competition is a factor of great economic and social advantage.

Again, competition has an important relation to the law of supply and demand. We think of the competitors as trying to supply what is in demand; and this is correct. But there is much more than this. Competition constantly creates new demand. In the effort to supply what is in demand, new articles are designed, new processes developed, new inventions tried out, and the range of demand is widened with the increased variety and richness of living.

The candle is succeeded by the oil lamp, this by gas and the special burner, and this in turn by the electric light; each has brought in a new sort of demand, which has added to rather than detracting from the original demand. So it is generally. The competition becomes not merely a means of securing the direct supply of the article desired, but a means of enlarging

and widening the demand itself, and so of indirectly turning social life into new channels. There is no career that offers greater rewards to the inventor and the independent thinker than this of business competition. In the domain of advertising alone its results are often remarkable. It shows at work the psychological principles of suggestion, imitation, self-display, and struggle for social place.

But my reader will have already remarked that this is true only of what we have called free competition — competition open to all or to many. It supposes the opportunity to be one that men of ability and some capital are free to engage in. It does not suppose conditions in which most men — all save the very few most capable or most rich — are excluded.

This is true, and in modern industrial life such conditions of free or individual competition are in great measure not realized. In place of it we have the

“restricted” competition in which great organizations of capital, having well-developed methods, and holding rights protected by patent, tend to absorb the opportunities of production and distribution. This is the side of competition mentioned above in our discussion of the method of industrial organization. It begins as co-operation, the union of resources on the part of two or more for a given result; it ends in the colossal trusts and monopolies of modern business.

These forms of industrial organization do, no doubt, interfere with the operation of the principles of production and demand of which I have just spoken. They tend to eliminate the direct competitor, to compel the production of certain types of articles (as in the case of the purchase and suppression of a new patent by a company that owns an old one), the artificial control of prices, the regulation of production, and the discouragement of initiative and variety. But we should

not for this reason condemn the organization, as such, off-hand. For it results from the operation of genuine business methods and has corresponding economic advantages.

What is more natural than that the two village blacksmiths should pool their business; each lending to the other the hand that is free, and so preventing idleness in one shop and congestion in the other? What more natural than that the two city drug stores should agree to cooperate, keeping one night clerk only or having a common delivery wagon. Such arrangements are not only reasonable; they are economical and effective, and for the good of business. But such arrangements are the root and reason of the trust and the monopoly; and when economic movements are thus rooted in economy and efficiency, society cannot talk of their evils alone or plan for their destruction. On the contrary, the most that can be done is to regulate them with

a view to minimizing the evil they work. I think the trust and combination have not only come to stay — being the outcome of forces that it is quite impossible to suppress — but they have come to recast the methods of actual business. It is a question of adjusting industrial and commercial life to a new order of activity.

Granting, therefore, the economy and efficiency of such combinations, what new aspects do they present when considered as methods of doing business?

At the outset, we may remark that they depend essentially upon co-operation; they tend, indeed, to rule out individual effort, except that of an exceptional kind. Under the methods of the combination the best men are given the greatest chance and others are set to tasks which organize their efforts to the ends of production. This may seem merciless as now conducted; it does not stimulate the average man enough, nor protect his individuality and humanity; but there is no reason

that the method of organization, under the direction of the greatest leaders and thinkers and inventors, should not be preserved without these disadvantages. The proper procedure would look to the introduction of subsidiary arrangements to humanize the average man and keep alive his personal energies and interests.

Again, it is evident that this growth in combination and organization carries further the movement which resulted in the rise of the business class and caused the original division of labor. We have seen that when society took on forms of divided enterprise, each man doing some one thing well rather than many things poorly, the business man came in to attend to the business side of life as such. That is his part. So now in the rise of combinations and trusts, new avenues of business are opened up. The delivery wagon of the store is succeeded by the express company, of which all the competitors make use. Transportation facili-

ties are used in common; they are "common carriers." The resources of nature, on which all alike depend, are made into independent sources of profit and of new business. So there arises a natural corrective to the growth of monopoly. The means upon which the competing companies or firms depend are subtracted from their monopolies, and made equally open to other agencies for competitive purposes.

This natural movement has been forwarded in the United States by projects of legislation looking to the complete neutralization of the railroads as common carriers. They are forbidden to grant special privileges or facilities (as in the practice of rebating.) The similar freeing of the coal supply from semi-private or corporate control as by railroads, and the prevention of ownership of competing lines, are measures looking to the freeing of the resources which are essential for business from the grasp of monopoly.

They suggest the return of competition on the higher plane of rivalry of combinations, instead of that of individuals. No doubt there will be developed in the commercial life of the future a code of business morality in the relations of combinations with one another — or at least a code of legality — corresponding to that now recognized between individual men. This is an interesting topic in the ethics of business.

In this matter of business method, however, having the two sides, competition and co-operation, a further fact is disclosed which is not so generally seen. I venture to state it at the risk of a little repetition.

I have mentioned above, it will be remembered, that two great movements go forward constantly in social life and show themselves in business; the collectivistic and the individualistic. The one tends to co-operation and united effort, the other to single-handed striving and

personal isolation. In all social institutions there are aspects which show both these tendencies at work. In the school we attempt to make the children social and co-operative, but without destroying their individuality and initiative. In the church we recognize authority and doctrine, but we stand up also for individual judgment and sturdy personal conviction. In morality we require common consent and solidarity, but we cherish the ethical freedom and choice of the single person.

Now in business we find the two tendencies illustrated, as I have said above; and it shows itself strikingly in the industrial combination. In all union of agencies and men in business projects, we have, of course, the collectivistic aspect of business; and in the motive of profit and wealth, we find the other, the individualistic. But in the corporation, we have the two put together. The end is individualistic: it is purely a business proposition, a means of profits to the

individual; but its means, its methods of accomplishing these ends, is collectivistic: it requires the united effort and teamwork of the whole body of those interested, employers and employees alike. The road agent who sells Standard Oil must make his personal commissions by praising the oil; he works as one of a team and by this means alone realizes his own personal advantage, which is wrapped up with the success of the company.

I cannot dwell upon the question of the attitude of the agent of a company to the affairs of his company, that is also a problem of the ethics of business; I wish only to point out that the object of the combination or trust is to make money for the proprietors or stockholders, and that the organization of the vast number of employees and agents of all kinds is entirely for that end. The end is secured by the work of all the members of the concern, each doing his part, for the production and distribution of the product.

The team-work is a collectivistic means to the success of the company in competition; the end is the profit of individuals.

An interesting contrast is presented when we compare this with the working of the socialistic idea, which is just the reverse. The socialist tells us that competition is not good; that it is not right to allow some concerns or individuals to destroy others; that such individualistic struggles should be prevented; and that to accomplish this all production should be taken over by agents of the state, to be carried on for the good of all. There should be a distribution to the individuals of the products of the soil and the air, the resources of nature. The established agent of all, the government, should run the business of society.

Of course, the difficulty with this proposal is that it takes away the incentive of individuals to do their best, to exert their powers of thought and action to the utmost. As we have seen above, such an

incentive is necessary to the best results; and if we remove the element of competition, with the advantage it gives to the successful competitor, there remains no adequate incentive.

The conclusion, therefore, which is forced upon us is that business can only be done on an individualistic or competitive basis. This is true, whether we take as instances the simple ventures of the small capitalist who competes with his neighbor, or those of the large concern which represents many combined interests. The motive remains the making of profits, and this is a legitimate motive. It shows itself also in the newest combinations, the trusts, which, despite the vast organization they represent, still exist only to make money.

III. THE ETHICS OF BUSINESS

I find that I have little space in which to speak of the principles of morality

which should dominate business life — the ethics of business. I can only point out briefly the motives which do animate the business man, and among them the one which should be the strongest and most cherished by him.

In recognizing the presence of competition in all trade, we have to recognize also that it is not money only and for itself that the business man desires and works for; it is money as representing a complicated set of relationships in which he and his family are placed. In the rivalry of business we see at work the three great sets of considerations which constitute modes of social struggle. One is the need of a living, of course, for oneself and one's family, and the best living possible. This is, of course, perfectly legitimate. It is one of the highest duties any man can set before him — to meet the responsibilities of his existence, and live the social life in respectability and comfort. Only through this can he

attain a position which will enable him to be a useful member of society and a factor in its improvement.

But besides this, certain more questionable motives come forward. One of these is what I have called the desire for social place and station. This is the motive of every man in some degree, arising from his having to live in a society in which there are inevitable distinctions of class. But besides its legitimate influence in keeping a man up to his proper status and place in life and society, it becomes a veritable craze for place.

Then there is the love of gain, pure and simple. Men get into the habit of striving for money, of driving a bargain, of making a deal, of outwitting a competitor; this becomes the passion of life. It is the price the business man pays for his unrelenting pursuit of profits and balances. He finds himself bound by the chains of business habit, and he is unhappy when he is forced to take a vacation. His

larger interests are starved and not only are the pleasures of society, of literature, and of a wider culture lost, but the loss is not even realized.

In the midst of these moral tendencies of the business life, the one corrective, to put it in a word, is found in that other motive which actually does move many business men and should not be too remote from the interests of all; it is what I have called the desire and struggle for *excellence*.

By this I do not mean simply a general feeling of the need of high standards of conduct and dealing, but a desire to produce and to enjoy the highest in detail. The best possible goods for the market, the best relations of employer and employed, the best concessions to customers, the best reputation for fairness and generosity, the best attitude toward the poor or unworthy workman or fellow tradesman — all this is what I mean by the term *excellence*. It is not merely a generous or altruistic outlet

for one's moral sentiment; it is a practical motive to success. It may not be true in the single case that more money will be made; but, in the long run, when the satisfactions of a life of business are counted up, there can be no doubt that any balance of financial loss due to standards of excellence will be more than compensated for by the enhanced reputation and standing of the man who has cherished this ideal. The great credits set down to the houses of high banking, commercial, and legal fame are not built up upon the record of sharp dealing, small advantage, underhand action, and misrepresentation; but upon a reputation for high standards of business promise fulfilled in equally high results of business attainment.

This applies in all the relations of business life. If there be one maxim of business morality which I think the considerations of a more philosophical sort justify, it is "love excellence" — excellent

goods, excellent men, excellent business and social relationships. One may love excellence because it will pay, but even then I say, love excellence for that reason rather than not at all.

CHAPTER VII

Sociology and the Philosophy of Society

WE may now conclude this brief sketch by suggesting the sphere that properly belongs to Social Science or Sociology, and with it to the Philosophy of Society. This we can do only by a statement of problems; space does not admit of any report of conclusions.

I

If it be true that the understanding of the constitution of the individual and of the group alike is possible only from the knowledge of psychological processes and motives, then it falls to Social Science to consider the objective modes of operation and the objective forms of embodiment of such processes and motives.

Exactly this, and no more. Social science is the science of the observation, classification, and statistical treatment of phenomena of every kind in which human beings are involved. No happening of any kind open to observation, no situation of any kind in which a human being acts or is acted upon, escapes it; and the complex results of such actions and situations constitute its subject-matter — the institutions, the transmissions, the aggregations, the dissolutions — in short, the results of the behavior of man, as shown in history, culture, and life.

It may be asked, *cui bono?*— why do this? — if psychology is to be appealed to to inform and interpret these facts? And this is a legitimate question. But it is easily answered. Psychology is equally limited and one-sided from its point of view. Psychology can say that a man in despair sought to kill himself; but the results of this in the social situation cannot be disclosed by psychology. And the

aggregate number of such cases, with the conditions of each, and the variations in time, space, and other objective circumstance cannot be made out at all by psychology. The facts of social intercourse, of human history, of institutions, creeds, customs, manners, traditions, all fall to social science, while the account of the subjective grounds of these facts — the motives, aspirations, feelings, rivalries, ideals, ventures, in the world of spiritual and inner meaning — this falls to psychology.

The objective study of society has two branches. Considering society historically, we have Sociology, a “general” science, which is genetic and comparative in its treatment of the social. As genetic, dealing with questions of the origin and descent of social groups, and of social evolution, with the interrelations of such groups with one another and with the environment, it is properly known as Socionomics.

Sociology is also a "comparative" science; it has to interpret the results of the "special" social sciences (economics, politics, ethics, etc.) in general theories of the motives and principles which embody themselves in the special institutions of society and the special modes of social life. It investigates, also, the larger questions of Social Philosophy.

Over against Sociology, considered as a "general" social science, we find the "special" social sciences, whose results, as just indicated, sociology has to interpret. These comprise all the possible special ways of approach to the actual social life, as embodied in Economics, Ethics, Social Psychology, Criminology, Penology, etc.

I append a table,* in which these divisions of social science are shown. Its headings will be readily understood

*The author's "Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology," Vol. II, article, "Social Sciences."

from what has just been said. In the full table, given in the publication referred to, detailed subheadings will be found.

SOCIAL SCIENCE

I. GENERAL: SOCIOLOGY, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.

a. Genetic.

b. Comparative.

II. SPECIAL, POLITICAL ECONOMY, ETHICS, CRIMINOLOGY, ETC.

In Social Philosophy the final questions of correlation present themselves: the laws of the constitution of societies, the relation of the psychological and objective factors, the development of collectivistic and individualistic motives, the stages and varieties of progress, the whole being considered in relation to the laws of biology, physics, and chemistry, by which human life and activity are conditioned. All these are philosophical questions, questions of the interpretation of the facts gathered from every possible angle of observation.

II

A word may be added in comment upon the place assigned to sociology in this scheme.

It is no doubt true, as many critics have said, either that sociology has no place among the sciences, or that it must claim a place that seems ambitious. If we seek for it data not already treated by some special science, then it is true that it has no place. The special sciences of human life and activity seem to cover the entire range of data. On the other hand, we cannot admit that these sciences are exhaustive, since their separation in method and point of view from each other cannot be final, and their relations must be interpreted. There arises, then, as in other branches of investigation — such as that of the relation of general biology to the special sciences of life, and that of the relation of ethics to the special sciences of conduct — the need of an

interpretation of the data of all the special social disciplines comparatively and genetically. This is what sociology does; and this is its legitimate field.

But just here its breadth of range comes into view. It does not confine itself strictly to what is from the psychological point of view, social; it has to consider all the "socioeconomic*" influences, external to the social, which condition and limit, which advance and illustrate, the social life. The environing and conditioning forces of all sorts, geographical, biological, chemical, physical, all have their place in a full account of the origin and progress of social life. Biological principles of adaptation, heredity, selec-

*Especially the physical and vital. See "Social and Ethical Interpretations," 3d ed., Introduction and Sect. 313 a. According to Barth, "Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie," this distinction was made by Auguste Comte. The biologist has to make a corresponding distinction between the merely bionomic" (conditioning or acting upon life) and the truly "vital." The latter belongs to the organism, the former to the environment. Cf. the terms Bionomic and Socioeconomic in the "Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology."

tion, struggle, etc., must be weighed, and their modified modes of operation, in the movement of the social group, pointed out.* All this gives to sociology a range, complexity, and difficulty which delay its progress, but do not disprove its right to exist.

The danger, however, to which the sociologist is exposed, is real; the danger of taking some of these auxiliary and merely "socioeconomic" principles, drawn from biology, mechanics, physics, etc., for legitimate statements of the principles of the social as such. He talks of social anatomy and physiology as if those terms were better than social "structure" and social "process"; while in reality they lead to analogies which obscure the essential differences between social organization and that of biology. Instead of "static," "dynamic," "equilibrium," "adaptation," etc., terms which suggest

*Cf. M. Worm's book, "Les Principes biologiques de l'Evolution sociale," in this series, and my "Darwin and the Humanities."

misleading analogies, and beg important questions in terms of physics and biology, let us speak of social "organization," "movement," "progress," "situations," "ideals," "processes," etc., employing terms that keep us within the spheres of psychology and morals.

It has been largely my purpose, indeed, in the foregoing pages, to show that it is to mental movements and processes that social life owes its existence, and its progress; it is from psychology, then, that the figures of speech we employ, if we must use them, should be drawn. To the essential movements which social life owes to men's minds, a completed sociology will finally add those conditioning principles, drawn from other provinces, biological and mechanical, in which these movements have both support and limitation, under the varied conditions of human life.



